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COPING IN A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE: SURVIVAL 
STRATEGIES FOR A 75-YEAR-OLD SEC 
James D. Cox*
OTWITHSTANDING cynicism to the contrary, data bear 
witness to the fact that government agencies come and go.1 
There are multiple causes that give rise to their disappearance, but 
two such causes are especially noteworthy. First, when the initial 
reasons that supported an agency’s creation no longer exist so that 
the regulatory needs that once prevailed are no longer present; and 
second, when a shift in understanding of the regulatory issues oc-
curs such that a different governmental response is now believed 
more appropriate the one Congress had embraced from when ini-
tially creating the agency. Certainly, the relative rigidity of the 
agency’s mandate and authority has much to do with its ability to 
survive changes in the social, economic, commercial, and scientific 
forces that shape its environment. One of the great illustrations of 
the vibrancy of the regulatory agency model, and particularly the 
notion of equipping such an agency with “quasi-legislative” author-
ity through broad enabling statutes, is the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. But can an agency created and operating through 
most of its years in the internationally insulated environment of 
U.S. capital markets survive in a world without borders such as to-
day’s global marketplace? 
N 
* Brainerd Currie Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. The author 
benefitted greatly from the comments received at workshops at the schools of law of 
Duke University, University of Iowa, University of California, Berkeley, and Van-
derbilt University as well as the conference convened in connection with this sympo-
sium and the helpful suggestions of Professors Stephen Choi, Jesse Fried, Robert 
Hillman, and Randall Thomas. I am particularly in the debt of the helpful research of 
Messrs. Adam Arkel, Christopher Fazekas, and Jonas Anderson.
1 See David E. Lewis, The Politics of Agency Termination: Confronting the Myth of 
Agency Immortality, 64 J. Pol. 89, 92–93 (2002) (noting 62% of agencies created since 
1946 were terminated by 1997); see also David E. Lewis, Presidents and the Politics of 
Agency Design: Political Insulation in the United States Government Bureaucracy, 
1946–1997, at 154 (2003) (noting the strongest variable contributing to an agency’s 
survival is the degree to which it is insulated from political control, such as through 
party balancing within its leadership). 
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There are many fundamental changes confronting the SEC to-
day that invite reflection on whether the independent regulatory 
agency structure continues to be the optimal model. Indeed, the 
changes that have visited the SEC since it was a youthful fifty are 
staggering.2 Consider that the SEC’s creation was part of the New 
Deal agenda that ultimately disentangled and kept separate com-
mercial banking, insurance, and investment banking. Federal regu-
lation was not seen as preemptive of the existing state blue sky 
laws, a view that reflected that much of what was to be regulated 
was local and not national. Consistent with this focused view of the 
markets was the reality that the principal market of America was 
the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), and when later securi-
ties trading markets arose they, like the NYSE, were nonprofit 
membership organizations. And, when the SEC was created—and 
for most of its life—it oversaw a paper-based society in which secu-
rities offerings and trading were local, not international. The world 
has changed dramatically from those simpler days. In 1999, the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act broke down the legislative walls that had 
separated commercial banking, investment banking, and insurance 
since the Great Depression.3 As a consequence, financial entities of 
all sizes now find their activities subject to multiple regulators. The 
federal-state partnership has been compromised by Congress re-
peatedly whittling back the permissible scope of state blue sky ad-
ministrators.4 In addition, today’s markets are profit centers that 
2 See the now classic symposium Fifty Years of Federal Securities Regulation, Sym-
posium on Contemporary Problems in Securities Regulation, 70 Va. L. Rev. 545 
(1984). 
3 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 
113 Stat. 1338 (1999).  
4 The most overt evidence of this is the National Securities Markets Improvement 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996), which preempted state regula-
tion of securities offerings for covered securities. Id. § 102. Somewhat more subtle in-
terference with state authority to protect its residents in securities transactions is evi-
denced by Congress’ enactment of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 
1998 (“SLUSA”), Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998), which empowers defen-
dants in certain securities class actions filed in state courts to seek the suit’s removal 
to federal court so that federal, not state, standards will be applied to determine their 
liability. Id. § 101. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 
71 (2006) (invoking SLUSA to remove suit initiated in state court by class of non-
selling investors to federal court where it was dismissed on the well-recognized pur-
chaser-seller standing requirement, which would not have applied had the suit re-
mained based solely on state law). 
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are publicly traded, thus compromising the earlier vision that the 
markets themselves would share the regulatory task.5 Each of these 
reflects a significant shift in the platform supporting the original vi-
sion of the SEC, but by far the largest shift is the combination of 
the ubiquity of the Internet and the convention that trading and of-
ferings are global so that markets are increasingly seamless. As a 
consequence, statesmanship among national regulators is not just 
valued but essential in today’s regulation of U.S. capital markets. 
The political debate today regarding the role of the SEC—or for 
that matter whether there is to be an SEC—is defined by the tsu-
nami of globalization now engulfing the SEC. Certainly if we begin 
to look back on the SEC’s initiatives over the past several years, we 
will see the most profound initiatives taken in response to global-
ization. Here we find the overarching strategy has been one of mu-
tual recognition. To the cynic, this reflects the regulator’s perspec-
tive that “if you cannot beat them, join them.” A more supportive 
view of mutual recognition is that the strategy offers an efficient 
solution for coping with the reality that rival markets are converg-
ing toward American reporting and operational practices.6 That is, 
differences between U.S. and foreign regimes are slight so that true 
convergence between them is not necessary to assure investor pro-
tection. A dramatic embrace of mutual recognition occurred in late 
2007 when the SEC lifted its seventy-five-year requirement that 
foreign issuers reconcile their financial reports to U.S. Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”).7 The SEC had earlier 
5 See Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of Corporate Governance Listing Require-
ments, 54 SMU L. Rev. 325, 347–52 (2001) (arguing that as exchanges demutualize 
they likely will find it unwise to maintain and enforce strong listing requirements so 
that federal regulation increasingly will extend to areas such as governance that here-
tofore has been their domain); Roberta S. Karmel, Turning Seats Into Shares: Causes 
and Implications of Demutualization of Stock and Futures Exchanges, 53 Hastings 
L.J. 367, 409–27 (2002); Norman S. Poser, The Stock Exchanges of the United States 
and Europe: Automation, Globalization, and Consolidation, 22 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 
497, 517, 532–39 (2001). 
6 See generally Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-Border 
Access to U.S. Investors: A New International Framework, 48 Harv. Int’l L.J. 31, 53–
59 (2007) (reviewing numerous considerations that support mutual recognition among 
countries with high, albeit differing, regulatory standards). 
7 See Acceptance from Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements Prepared in 
Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards Without Reconciliation 
to U.S. GAAP, Securities Act Release No. 33-8879, 73 Fed. Reg. 986 (2008), reprinted 
in [2002 to Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 88,032 (Dec. 21, 
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announced it might permit domestic firms to prepare their financial 
statements in accordance with International Financial Reporting 
Standards (“IFRS”) rather than GAAP.8 And, in fall 2008 the SEC 
placed the death of GAAP, at least for securities disclosures, on 
the agenda by proposing that ultimately all U.S. issuers must com-
ply with IFRS.9 Increasingly, the SEC’s regulatory posture on fi-
nancial reporting issues is one of accommodation to foreign issuers 
rather than its historical position of demanding obeisance to the 
U.S. way.10 These developments and others bear testament that 
technology has made the world a smaller and more integrated 
place for investors and firms seeking capital through public offer-
ings. U.S.-based investors and issuers invest and raise capital in 
foreign markets at an ever-increasing pace; foreign investors ac-
quire securities in U.S. capital markets and foreign issuers raise 
significant amounts of capital through public offerings in the 
United States. Indeed, there is an accelerating pace of such trans-
national investing and offerings.11
2007). Not only did the SEC eliminate the reconciliation requirement for foreign pri-
vate issuers whose financial statements are prepared according to International Fi-
nancial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”) as issued by the International Accounting 
Standards Board (“IASB”), but it also qualified this condition to permit issuers to de-
part from strict adherence to IFRS on their treatment of fair value and hedge fund 
accounting that had drawn the disapproval of E.U. authorities in response to heavy 
lobbying by public companies. Id. 
8 See Concept Release on Allowing U.S. Issuers to Prepare Financial Statements in 
Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standard, Securities Act Release 
Nos. 33-8831, 72 Fed. Reg. 45,600 (proposed Aug. 14, 2007), reprinted in [2002 to Cur-
rent Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,944 (Aug. 7, 2007). 
9 See Roadmap for the Potential Use of Financial Statements Prepared in Accor-
dance with International Financial Reporting Standards by U.S. Issuers, Securities 
Act Release No. 33-8982, 73 Fed. Reg. 70,816 (proposed Nov. 21, 2008), reprinted in 
[2002 to Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 88,409 (Nov. 14, 2008). 
10 See, e.g., Exemption of Certain Foreign Brokers or Dealers, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 34-58047, 73 Fed. Reg. 39,182 (proposed July 8, 2008), reprinted in [2002 to 
Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 88,235 (June 27, 2008) (propos-
ing a conditional exemption permitting foreign brokers to represent U.S.-based inves-
tors premised on the SEC being satisfied of relative comparability of regulation by the 
foreign regulator of the foreign broker or dealer). 
11 For a thoughtful review of trend lines in cross-border offerings and trading, see 
Howell E. Jackson & Eric J. Pan, Regulatory Competition in International Securities 
Markets: Evidence from Europe – Part II, 3 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 207 (2008) (detailing 
waning interest in U.S. markets by European issuers that predated the passage of Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) reflecting the growing maturity of European mar-
kets that has, in turn, increased the willingness of U.S. institutions to trade in the or-
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As technology has made national borders seamless, it challenges 
the territorial orientation of securities regulations. In the past, na-
tions governed the disclosure requirements that applied to securi-
ties transactions undertaken within their borders. For example, a 
Japanese firm seeking to list its securities on the NYSE had to 
comply with U.S. disclosure requirements, and if a U.S. investor 
purchased the Japanese issuer’s security on the Tokyo Stock Ex-
change, that investor depended not on the protective provisions of 
the U.S. securities laws but on those laws that applied to Japanese 
companies.12 This reality has not changed, except now the SEC 
provides that the Japanese issuer may use IFRS to satisfy its U.S. 
disclosure requirements. This Article will examine the social con-
sequences of mutual recognition and what it portends for securities 
regulators around the globe.13 Indeed, this Article’s focus will be 
dinaries in a foreign market rather than American Depositary Receipts in a U.S. mar-
ket). 
12 The notable exception to such territoriality is the passport enjoyed by issuers 
within the European Union whereby compliance with the disclosure requirements of 
one member state permits an issuer to raise capital and to list its securities in another 
member state without the necessity of satisfying the disclosure requirements of that 
state. This approach, however, requires that each member state’s laws satisfy the min-
imum requirements broadly called for by the various directives of the European Un-
ion. See Parliament and Council Directive, Directive 2003/71/EC, 2003 O.J. (L345) 64 
(imposing standard of maximum harmonization of listing particulars across member 
states as well as requiring members to permit offerings within their borders of security 
offerings approved by another member state’s regulatory authority). 
13 There are at least three distinct regulatory paths that diverge from the status quo. 
One path leads us to multilateral agreements whereby participating nations agree to a 
single set of disclosure standards, which would be applied to companies of all signa-
tory nations. Another path takes us in a different regulatory direction where, instead 
of a single, monolithic set of mandatory disclosure requirements, globalization may 
instead lead to multiple standards to be represented in a single market. Such an ap-
proach essentially collapses into their home market the environment in which all in-
vestors have access to a world market where there are numerous disclosure regimes. 
The third approach is a mixture of the two preceding alternatives. 
 The focus of multilateral agreements would be to establish minimum disclosure 
standards among signatory nations, but allow some nations to impose more demand-
ing requirements. The template for this third approach is the set of practices author-
ized within the European Community (“E.C.”). The cornerstones of securities regula-
tion in the European Community are the principles of minimum standards and 
mutual recognition, whereby minimum disclosure standards for members are set by 
various E.C. directives and an issuer’s compliance with the requirements of one 
member provides it with a “passport” to sell or list its securities within another mem-
ber state. Interestingly, a few member countries impose disclosure requirements sub-
stantially more rigorous than the minimum level demanded by the applicable E.C. di-
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even broader in revealing that globalization forces us to rethink the 
ultimate role of securities regulation in an environment of global 
trading and offerings.  
I. THE GAAP-IFRS DIVIDE 
Despite having a nearly decade-long unwavering commitment to 
convergence in accounting principles during which there have been 
significant cooperative efforts on both sides of the Atlantic, GAAP 
and IFRS today are hardly mirror images of one another.14 The 
most dramatic evidence of their dissimilarities is not gleaned by 
close analysis of their arcane provisions but simply by hefting each 
set of accounting standards. When the various statements that 
comprise GAAP are “stacked” side by side with IFRS pronounce-
ments, the latter is dwarfed by nearly a foot. This reflects not the 
rectives. Thus, within the European Community, multiple standards can exist within a 
single market. An approach significantly more extreme than that within the European 
Community would occur if there were no agreement respecting minimum standards. 
A significantly more extreme approach than that of the European Community would 
involve no agreement respecting minimum standards . . . This is the regulatory path 
suggested by the second alternative. To the extent that all of the above approaches 
lead to some form and scope of mandatory disclosure requirements, they each pro-
vide at least one obvious advantage to investors: the avoidance of added transaction 
costs investors now incur if they place their trades in a country different from the one 
in which they live. This reduces the costs they now incur when they make an invest-
ment choice that also substitutes the protections of their home country’s securities 
laws for those of the country hosting their purchase or sale. One may well see that 
such a future approach, in which the applicable disclosure laws are not determined 
solely by the host country, is an ever-increasing reality as the natural movement to-
ward a globalized economy occurs. Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable 
Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulations, 71 S. Cal. 
L. Rev. 903 (1998) (reasoning that in the face of globalization of capital markets issu-
ers should enjoy broad choice of the laws guiding their disclosure requirements). 
14 See William W. Bratton & Lawrence A. Cunningham, Treatment Differences and 
Political Realities in the GAAP-IFRS Debate, Appendix,  95 Va. L. Rev. 1009–23 
(2009) (providing a careful and detailed comparison of major reporting items isolating 
important differences that persist between the two sets of standards). The distance 
that separates IFRS from GAAP has created opposition to the abolition of the 
GAAP reconciliation. See, e.g., Letter from Jack Ciesielski, Member, FASB Investors 
Technical Advisory Comm., to Nancy M. Morris, Secretary, SEC (Aug. 31, 2007) 
(“To eliminate the reconciliation at this time would amount to nothing more than 
achieving convergence by decree, rather than by achieving it in fact.”), available at 
http://sec.gov/comments/s7-13-07/s71307-16.pdf; Steve Burkholder, FASB Panel Op-
poses SEC Proposal to Drop Reconciliation for IFRS Filers, 39 BNA Sec. Reg. L. 
Rep. 1414–15 (2007). 
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incompleteness of coverage by IFRS but rather its lack of detail, 
what most attribute to IFRS being principles-based as contrasted 
with the more detailed, rules-based orientation of GAAP. The 
generality of IFRS reflects mainly where it has been, or better yet, 
where it has not been. IFRS, unlike GAAP, is developed as a body 
of reporting standards applicable to multiple cultures. Its wide 
adoption is reflective of its malleable quality that allows it to be 
applied across differing industries and business cultures. Moreover, 
it lacks the decades-long accretion of experience that has shaped 
GAAP. Thus, while championed as the model for principles-based 
regulation, IFRS may more aptly be understood as a youthful, 
multi-cultured filter for financial reporting. The effects that flow 
from the significant differences in the orientation and girth be-
tween GAAP and IFRS have been much examined.15
The fertile areas for investigation of the differences between 
GAAP and IFRS are the reported assets, liabilities, and income 
statement items used by foreign issuers when satisfying the earlier 
requirement that they reconcile their financial statements to 
GAAP. Such reconciliations occur annually on SEC Form 20-F, 
which mandates that foreign issuers identify the material differ-
ences between GAAP and IFRS (or other reporting standards 
used in the foreign issuer’s home country in preparing its reports) 
and disclose the numerical impact of that difference on income and 
owners’ equity. 
IFRS enjoys broad popularity around the world. The chairman 
of the International Accounting Standards Board (“IASB”) re-
ports that the number of countries embracing IFRS is about 100 
(with many more expected), whereas only a minority adhere to 
GAAP.16 The principles-based orientation of IFRS and the flexibil-
ity it provides in reporting a firm’s financial performance and posi-
tion explain its greater popularity.17 The attractiveness of a uniform 
set of principles-based standards culminated in the European Un-
15 See infra notes – . 
16 Geoffrey Pickard, Simplifying Global Accounting: IASB Chair Discusses the Fu-
ture of IFRS, U.S. GAAP and the Global Accounting Profession, J. Acct., July 2007, 
at 36. 
17 See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, The SEC’s Global Accounting Vision: A Re-
alistic Appraisal of a Quixotic Quest, 87 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 15–16 (2008) (noting IFRS 
“qualities of looseness and vagueness and the absence of detail and guidance became 
an asset” in the surge of adoptions around the globe in the early 2000s). 
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ion mandating that all E.U.-listed firms must, beginning in 2005, 
report in accordance with IFRS, thus striking a fatal blow to pro-
vincial country-based European reporting standards.18 Foreign issu-
ers whose shares were listed in the United States, and who there-
fore were required to provide the annual reconciliation to GAAP, 
reaped a benefit for their managers, since using IFRS yielded in-
creases in reported income over what would have been reported 
pursuant to their former country-based accounting.19 The wonders 
of IFRS alchemy propelled it to a most-favored position around 
the globe, but it also creates a cause for concern, which appears in 
a study of 2005 and 2006 reconciliations to GAAP by seventy-three 
European IFRS reporting issuers. Eighty-two percent of the com-
panies had materially higher net income under IFRS than under 
GAAP.20 The study concludes, somewhat wistfully, “if [U.S.] com-
panies were given the option to use IFRS rather than [U.S.] GAAP 
then this would provide a boost to book earnings and returns.”21
Among the problems encountered by researchers examining the 
earlier mandated Form 20-F reconciliations is that the examined 
foreign issuers may not have been reporting according to IFRS, as 
issued by the IASB, but rather according to a home country varia-
tion of IFRS. That is, the differences reported above may well be 
magnified by country-specific deviations from the IFRS’s standards 
embraced by the IASB.22 Indeed, accountants do not disclose 
whether the IFRS standards being employed are those promul-
gated by the IASB or are a home country variation of IFRS. The 
18 Eur. Parl. Doc. (PE 308.463) (2002), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
meetdocs/committees/juri/20020225/461067EN.pdf. 
19 Donna L. Street, Council of Institutional Investors, International Convergence of 
Accounting Standards: What Investors Need to Know 11–13 (2007). 
20 David Jetuah, Citigroup Lays Out IFRS-US GAAP Gulf, Acct. Age, Aug. 30, 
2007, at 9 (noting mean net income was 23% greater and median net income reported 
under IFRS was 6% greater than GAAP). 
21 Id. 
22 For example, the U.K. Financial Services Authority recently observed that incon-
sistent national applications of IFRS across European countries was a major problem 
with IFRS reporting. Fin. Servs. Auth., Financial Risk Outlook 2007, at 112 (2007) 
(“[U]nder a principles-based accounting framework, there may be relevant economic 
and legal differences between countries such that similar transactions might legiti-
mately be reported in different ways . . . . [S]hould local custom or national interest 
operate to threaten the consistent application of IFRS, much of this anticipated bene-
fit could be lost.”). 
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IFRS’s principles-based approach allows for certain judgments in 
this area, but the potential for manipulation at minimum calls for 
greater transparency so users can determine whether a firm has 
made its reporting decisions within the acceptable outer limits of 
the principles-based IFRS, as set out by the IASB.23
History suggests there may well be a lurking compliance prob-
lem with the SEC’s current position. The rage in the late 1990s was 
the German Neuer Markt whose issuers were required to conform 
their financial reports to then-existing International Accounting 
Standards (“IAS”) or GAAP. After the collapse of that market be-
cause of the failures of so many of its listed companies, it appears 
that there was significant non-compliance with this reporting re-
quirement by listed companies.24 This suggests that the quality of 
reporting is not solely a matter of the metrics by which reporting 
items are to be measured but, more significantly, that company 
compliance with the stated metric is linked to how effective en-
forcement efforts are in the issuer’s home market to assure compli-
ance. That is, the quality of reporting is likely dependent more on 
the enforcement oversight in the issuer’s home country than it is on 
the quality of the reporting metric itself. 
A further concern is that the IASB and the reporting standards 
it adopts will continue to reflect the discrete intrusions of those 
who are to be governed by the standards. The IASB’s current fi-
nancial structure invites public and private incursions on its inde-
pendence since its funding depends not only on voluntary contribu-
tions, but also voluntary contributions from the private, issuer-
dominated sector, which in actuality comprise its largest source of 
funding.25 It was because the FASB was dependent on voluntary 
contributions from the private sector that a central component of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”), enacted in the wake of a 
23 This is a point made in a study counseling that it was premature to cast aside the 
reconciliation requirement because it was only through reconciliation that users can 
discern the extent of the deviation, if any, from the IASB promulgated version of 
IFRS. See Neri Bukspan & Ron Joas, Standard & Poor’s, Commentary Report: The 
Road to Convergence: U.S. GAAP at the Crossroads 4 (2007). 
24 Martin Glaum & Donna L. Street, Compliance with the Disclosure Requirements 
of Germany’s New Market: IAS Versus US GAAP, 14 J. Int’l Fin. Mgmt. & Acct. 64, 
64 (2003). 
25 See Press Release, IASB, Update on Funding for 2008 (Feb. 4, 2008), available at 
http://www.iasb.org/News/Press+Releases/Update+on+Funding+for+2008.htm. 
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national revulsion to the extensive financial frauds by public com-
panies that came to light in 2001, mandates independence in fund-
ing as a precondition for SEC recognition of a body as an authori-
tative accounting standard setter.26 After the passage of SOX, the 
FASB is funded by fees assessed against reporting companies. The 
IASB is not funded in this manner and thus its independence from 
political pressures remains an important concern.27 For example, 
less than one year after the IASB was formed from the reorganiza-
tion of its predecessor, which was believed to have lacked sufficient 
independence,28 the newly installed IASB chairman complained 
that powerful donors had threatened to withdraw their financial 
support if the IASB did not show greater consideration of their 
views in future deliberations.29 Most recently, the IASB, under 
pressure from E.U. members and the banking community, em-
braced a change in accounting classification of financial derivatives 
that will allow banks to avoid recognizing billions of dollars in 
losses attributable to the substantial decline in values related to the 
credit crisis.30 While such pressures have been evident in the United 
States, they have not caused the FASB to buckle in the same man-
ner as the IASB. 
We therefore can see that very different environments surround 
the development and utilization of IFRS and GAAP. Importantly, 
26 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 108(b)(1)(A)(iii) (amending Securities Act Section 
19(b), 15 U.S.C. 77s (requiring funding as set forth in Section 109)) (funding shall 
come from “accounting support fees” that are imposed upon reporting companies in 
proportion to each firm’s share of the average equity market capitalization of all 
firms). 
27 See, e.g., Walter Mattli & Tim Büthe, Global Private Governance: Lessons From 
a National Model of Setting Standards in Accounting, 68 Law & Contemp. Probs., 
Summer 2005, at 225, 254 (collecting data that reflects both IASB and pre-SOX 
FASB heavy dependence on Big Five (now the Big Four) accounting firms and their 
audit clients for funding). 
28 See David S. Ruder et al., Creation of World Wide Accounting Standards: Con-
vergence and Independence, 25 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 513, 526–27, 536–37 (2005) (re-
viewing the evolution of the IASB toward greater independence from industry influ-
ence). 
29 Mattli & Büthe, supra note 27, at 254. 
30 See Sara Schaefer Muñoz, EU Banks Get Leeway on Making Write-Downs, Wall 
St. J. Oct. 20, 2008, at C1 (discussing how the change allows banks to reclassify in-
vestments as long-term and beyond the “mark-to-market” requirement and given the 
lax enforcement that prevails in the European Union, analysts fear that such reclassi-
fication will not be rare but rampant). 
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these cultural differences. Accordingly, IFRS and GAAP are not 
mirror images of one another and there is little cause to believe 
that they will ever be. To be sure, there may well be relatively brief 
moments of time of true convergence, but since the cultural forces 
that shape each are not themselves correlated with one another, we 
cannot expect these standards to be identical. More important, be-
cause IFRS is intended to reach across continental borders such 
that it is truly a set of multi-cultural accounting standards, IFRS 
will always call for greater generality than we can expect for the 
more culturally focused standard, GAAP. Hence, IFRS of neces-
sity is principles-based such that it naturally invites more discretion 
and choice than GAAP embraces for the discrete lore of financial 
reporting. Thus, in a capital market in which both IFRS and 
GAAP exist, managers of reporting issuers enjoy a choice of real 
significance, but allowing them such choice comes with costs to the 
ability of securities regulators to perform their functions. 
II. MANDATORY DISCLOSURE AND THE MISSION OF THE 
SECURITIES LAWS 
Choice generally is a wonderful thing. With choice there is the 
freedom to pursue what one believes is in his best interest. Choice, 
therefore, is the cornerstone of our market-based economy since it 
is the consumer’s freedom to choose that guides production and ul-
timately to what production functions capital is directed. More pro-
ductive uses are funded and at a higher return on investment com-
pared with ventures that are seen as less attractive. Importantly, in 
seeking capital, producers have a choice as well, not only with re-
spect to how they will finance their projects, but also in today’s 
global market where they will seek that financing. 
Even though there is a worldwide commitment to the alloca-
tional function of capital markets, each country shapes the capital 
raising process by its own set of mandatory disclosure rules. Thus, 
although the securities laws of nations share common goals, they 
vary widely in how they seek to achieve these objectives. Investors, 
therefore, not only enjoy a choice of investment opportunities, but 
they also enjoy choice among competing markets, which are distin-
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guished by, among other features, their differing regulatory re-
gimes.31 For example, baseline disclosure requirements for offer-
ings and trading in securities in the United Kingdom are regulated 
by the Financial Services Administration, while those in the United 
States are regulated by its SEC, and so forth. Correlatively, the se-
curities regulator’s jurisdiction is confined to the borders of the na-
tions in which it is located so that transactions within its jurisdiction 
are regulated exclusively by its disclosure rules, even though inves-
tors and issuers may prefer a different regime.32 In this way, each 
securities regulator enjoys a regulatory monopoly over securities 
transactions within its nation’s borders. 
To apprise how regulators should respond to the threat that glo-
balization poses to their regulatory monopolies, we need to under-
31 To be sure, investors and issuers who prefer opportunities governed by one regu-
latory regime over those of their home country can direct their transactions to that 
jurisdiction. Thus, choice does exist, but its exercise entails additional costs to both 
the issuer and the investor that would not exist if the issuer and the investors could 
have matched their interest in their home jurisdiction rather than in another regula-
tory jurisdiction. The benefits of this choice for issuers flows from the issuer’s man-
agement opting for the higher standards and enforcement of the host market as a way 
of signaling management’s confidence that they pose fewer risks to investors than 
their counterparts who do not choose to so bond themselves by obtaining a secondary 
listing in the higher regulation market. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the 
Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on International 
Corporate Governance, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1757, 1779–97 (2002) (arguing foreign 
firms overcome weak home country shareholder protections by cross-listing in the 
United States). For a review of the fundamental components of the securities laws 
across major markets, see Marc I. Steinberg & Lee E. Michaels, Disclosure in Global 
Securities Offerings: Analysis of Jurisdictional Approaches, Commonality and Recip-
rocity, 20 Mich. J. Int’l L. 207, 210–35 (1999). 
32 In any country, there is always the option for issuers to provide greater disclosure 
than required by the host country where the issuer believes this is in its best interest. 
The regulatory rubber hits the pavement where the issuer and investors may prefer 
less disclosure than is mandated in the host country. It is the latter—less disclosure—
situation in which the issue of menus exists. In the former situation—more disclo-
sure—there is no serious conflict between regulators, issuers, and investors. 
 The territorial orientation of a nation’s jurisdiction to prescribe and to enforce its 
regulatory objectives is the predominant approach, so that exceptions arise in those 
rare instances when conduct committed outside its borders threatens harm or causes 
actual harm to its national interest. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States §§ 402–03 (1986); id. § 402 n.1. See generally James D. Cox 
et al., Securities Regulation: Cases and Materials 1131–42 (5th ed. 2006). The U.S. ju-
risdiction to prescribe in the securities area is even more narrowly based on territorial 
considerations. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States § 416 (1986). 
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stand the overall pricing function of markets. There is a good deal 
of debate regarding not only whether securities markets are effi-
cient,33 but more fundamentally what the meaning of market effi-
ciency is.34 This Article proceeds first on the assumption that secu-
rity prices are fundamentally efficient, which is to say that investors 
33 For a close review of the twists and turns of the debate surrounding the meaning 
and implications of the efficient market hypothesis, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, 
From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of the Efficient 
Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 546 (1994). For a review of evi-
dence at odds with the efficient market hypothesis, see Kent Daniel et al., Investor 
Psychology and Security Market Under- and Overreactions, 53 J. Fin. 1839 (1998). 
The weakest link in the efficient market hypothesis is the rational actor model of in-
vestor behavior and the presence of arbitrage by sophisticated investors to overcome 
any pricing imbalances that arise because of irrational or other actors’ distortions. See 
generally Andrei Shleifer, Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral Fi-
nance 10–16 (2000) (reviewing a number of theories from behavioral literature that 
weigh against efficient pricing of securities); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 
The Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. Fin. 35 (1997) (detailing how arbitrage likely is ineffec-
tive in correcting prices during conditions of extreme volatility); Lynn A. Stout, The 
Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. Corp. 
L. 635 (2003) (providing an insightful review of literature challenging the conven-
tional efficient market hypothesis and concluding the literature better supports a 
model of heterogeneity among investors where stock prices mechanisms are more 
aptly captured by behavioral finance models). On the one hand, carried to its logical 
conclusion, a behavioral finance-based model of stock pricing mechanisms can be 
seen as calling for greater SEC-driven paternalism. See Donald C. Langevoort, Tam-
ing the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities 
Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 135, 185–88 (2002) (arguing behavioral insights should 
be incorporated into the cost-benefit assessments of regulatory initiatives); Robert 
Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding 
Proposals for Its Future, 51 Duke. L.J. 1397, 1485–94, 1509–11 (2002) (justifying man-
datory disclosure regulation as necessary to address a range of cognitive biases com-
mon to investors). On the other hand, such a model could justify a much more cir-
cumscribed approach to regulation. See generally Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, 
Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (2003) (arguing that cognitive 
biases also impact the SEC’s administration of the securities laws so that in combina-
tion the value of regulation is drawn further into question). For more sweeping criti-
cism, see Robert A. Haugen, The New Finance: The Case Against Efficient Markets 
(1995) (providing a critical quantitative review of theory and evidence frequently in-
voked to support the efficient market hypothesis). 
34 See, e.g., Robert C. Merton, A Simple Model of Capital Market Equilibrium with 
Incomplete Information, 42 J. Fin. 483 (1987) (reasoning that market efficiency is a 
useful abstraction in that the model offers the best description of securities pricing in 
the long run, albeit subject to limited precision). In the end, we might conclude that 
Professor Merton is correct: “[T]he perfect-market model of efficiency may be a use-
ful abstraction . . . [but we should] be cognizant of the insensitivity of this model to 
institutional complexities and explicitly assess the limits of precision that can be rea-
sonably expected from its predictions.” Id. at 486. 
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impound in their trading beliefs respecting the intrinsic value they 
attach to an additional unit of disclosure.35 Simply put, this Article’s 
initial assumptions are that market forces accurately price the risks 
posed by a security and that to the extent two securities are similar 
in all respects except that one security provides an additional unit 
of disclosure that the investors believe relevant and the other secu-
rity does not, investors not only distinguish between the two securi-
ties but also rationally price the consequences of the differing dis-
closures made between the two securities. With a market that is so 
efficient, our comfort level in a regulatory strategy that permits 
parties to opt for the reporting metrics of their choice—for exam-
ple, GAAP or IFRS—should be influenced by our belief that the 
security will be accurately priced to reflect the bargain that is 
struck including the disclosure risk implicit in that bargain.36
Nobel Laureate George Akerlof’s “market for lemons” provides 
the framework for illustrating the pricing of securities in a market 
that is fundamentally efficient when there are differing disclosure 
35 That markets operate so that new information not only becomes rapidly embed-
ded in the security’s price but also the resulting price reflects the security’s intrinsic 
value is sometimes referred to as fundamental market efficiency. It has wisely been 
observed that there is a less efficient state, namely, that security prices may well rap-
idly reflect new information but the security’s price will not necessarily align with its 
fundamental/intrinsic value. See Mark Rubinstein, Securities Market Efficiency in an 
Arrow-Debreu Economy, 65 Am. Econ. Rev. 812, 820–23 (1975) (contrasting infor-
mational efficiency with fundamental efficiency); Lawrence H. Summers, Does the 
Stock Market Rationally Reflect Fundamental Values?, 41 J. Fin. 591 (1986); James 
Tobin, On the Efficiency of the Financial System, Lloyds Bank Rev. 1 (July 1984). 
36 Because of the importance to investors that they be able to price regulatory dis-
closure differences across issuers, we can understand why it is equally important to 
policymaking whether disclosure gaps arising under one disclosure regime vis-à-vis a 
more demanding regime can be priced in the market. For an insightful analysis of how 
we might measure whether particular disclosure policies enhance share price accu-
racy, see Merritt B. Fox, Measuring Share Price Accuracy, 1 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 113 
(2004) (arguing that the best proxy of share price accuracy for an individual security is 
the degree of correlation with movement of all other firms in the economy). See gen-
erally Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy, and Economic Performance: 
The New Evidence, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 331 (2003) (presenting evidence that the SEC’s 
mandated management discussion and analysis disclosures improve share-price accu-
racy and concluding such improvement contributes to allocational efficiency). For in-
sight as to what might explain such correlation differences across developing and 
emerging markets, see Allen Ferrell, If We Understand the Mechanisms, Why Don’t 
We Understand Their Output?, 28 J. Corp. L. 503 (2003). 
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metrics for issuers in the same market.37 Assume that all securities 
are the same except that one-half have an intrinsic value per share 
of $22 (the X Issuers) and the value for the other half is $20 (the Y 
Issuers).38 Assume further that even under the existing disclosure 
requirements, investors will be unable to distinguish X Issuers from 
Y Issuers. Without additional disclosures, X and Y Issuer securities 
can be expected to trade at $21 per share, so that the securities of 
X Issuers are undervalued and those of Y Issuers are overvalued.39 
In the perfect world, X Issuers find this result intolerable and Ak-
erlof’s insights predict that minimally X will seek credible means to 
signal their true value or, failing that, the X Issuer will at least not 
engage in offering their securities to investors for what the X Is-
suer’s managers know is a price that undervalues their worth.40
But the world is not perfect. Issuers are guided by their manag-
ers’ utility functions, which may well cause them to conclude it is 
37 George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Mar-
ket Mechanism, 84 Q.J. Econ. 488 (1970). 
38 While financial theory and empirical work focuses on security returns, for simplic-
ity the illustrations in this Article deal with the ultimate effects of changes in return, 
namely the security’s price. 
39 For a review of the literature on the impact disclosure has on the cost of equity 
capital, see Christine A. Botosan, Disclosure Level and the Cost of Equity Capital, 72 
Acct. Rev. 323 (1997). One of the paradoxes of just such a view of capital markets is 
what incentives there are to reward arbitrageurs to drive securities to their intrinsic 
values. Does efficiency rest upon some mispricing in any case so as to provide signifi-
cant rewards for arbitrage behavior? See Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 
On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 Am. Econ. Rev. 393 
(1980) (speculating that private information in the possession of arbitrageurs provides 
such rewards). 
40 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the 
Protection of Investors, 70 Va. L. Rev. 669, 673–77 (1984). The resulting information 
hierarchy is consistent with studies that have found that increased levels of disclosure 
by firms reduce investor concerns respecting the informational advantages between 
the firm and outside investors such that when the firm offers its securities, the higher 
disclosing firms incur a lower cost of capital. See Douglas W. Diamond & Robert E. 
Verrecchia, Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital, 46 J. Fin. 1325 (1991). The 
clear advantage of proceeding cautiously in designating what and when information 
must be disclosed is demonstrated by the possible harm that weakening rewards for 
incentive behavior can cause. That is, a clear cost of mandating a single disclosure 
standard is that the mandated requirement may be set too high in terms of the social 
costs it leads to, such as reducing the rewards for incentive behavior by greatly reduc-
ing any first mover advantage by alerting others to the gains the disclosing firm has 
garnered through its innovative efforts. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Prac-
tice of Securities Disclosure, 61 Brook. L. Rev. 763, 853–54 (1995). 
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better for them to be lost in the crowd of $21 issuers than to set 
themselves apart from that group. There are multiple reasons this 
strategy may be pursued by X Issuers’ managers. For example, to 
announce their true returns may attract competition and in the 
long run erode the secure existence managers seek.41 Managers 
may also contemplate taking the firm private at some future date 
(somewhat analogous to insider trading on a massive scale). Or, 
frankly, their stock options might not have been granted or those 
granted might not have vested, so that a future bump in the price is 
to their advantage. Finally, delaying recognition of a gain today 
may provide some reserve for moderating a future unexpected dip 
in the firm’s value.42 The host market’s securities regulator is dis-
turbed not only by the fear that managers are not choir boys, but 
also by the fear that natural forces may well fail to induce action by 
managers to separate X firms from Y firms in the eyes of investors. 
Moreover, regulators genuinely fear that some groups of investors 
(those purchasing more Y than X securities) receive a below aver-
age return for the level of risk embraced. And, viewing the prob-
lem even more broadly, allocational concerns arise if either X Issu-
ers or Y Issuers raise capital in transactions in which the market 
price for their respective security influences the issuer’s cost of 
capital. Simply put, inaccurate securities prices impair the alloca-
tional efficiency of capital markets, a central objective of securities 
regulation. 
41 See Mary Stanford Harris, The Association Between Competition and Managers’ 
Business Segment Reporting Decisions, 36 J. Acct. Res. 111, 111–12 (1998) (observing 
that in industries where there is low competition and abnormally high profits, manag-
ers are more unwilling to undertake segment reporting than their counterparts in 
competitive industries). 
42 See John R. Graham et al., The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial 
Reporting, 40 J. Acct. & Econ. 3, 47 (2005) (finding more than three-fourths of 401 
surveyed financial executives would give up economic value in exchange for smoother 
earnings). 
 A further concern is whether incentives to signal are stronger in large capitalization 
firms than smaller ones. The favorable impact on a firm’s cost of capital arising from 
an incremental increase in disclosure flows from increased demand of large institu-
tional investors who are—out of concerns for liquidity—more likely to populate lar-
ger market capitalized firms than smaller ones. This has caused some to reason that 
increased disclosure may produce more observable market responses for large market 
capitalization firms than for smaller firms. Diamond & Verrecchia, supra note 40, at 
1348–49. 
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Thus, the securities regulator will consider disclosure require-
ments that will bring about greater pricing accuracy for securities. 
Suppose that the baseline disclosure requirements in the above il-
lustration do not include line of business reporting requirements 
and that if such information were disclosed it would distinguish X 
Issuers from Y Issuers.43 The securities regulator could pursue the 
objective of improved pricing of securities and allocational effi-
ciency by adopting line of business reporting so that investors are 
able to distinguish X Issuers from Y Issuers with the result that af-
ter this new information each security trades at its intrinsic value. 
Upon disclosure of line of business information, X Issuers will 
trade at $22 and the Y Issuers will trade at $20.44 As a result, the 
lemons market is avoided and allocational efficiency is enhanced. 
43 There is extensive literature demonstrating that disclosure of line of business in-
formation to investors has a significant effect on the price of the disclosing firm’s se-
curities. See, e.g., Philip G. Berger & Rebecca Hann, The Impact of SFAS No. 131 on 
Information and Monitoring, 41 J. Acct. Res. 163, 164–67 (2003) (observing that 
heightened line of business reporting not only changed securities prices but also im-
pacted firm behavior); Marilyn Magee Greenstein & Heibatollah Sami, The Impact of 
the SEC’s Segment Disclosure Requirement on Bid-Ask Spreads, 69 Acct. Rev. 179, 
179–80 (1994) (showing statistically significant narrowing of spreads upon firms’ ini-
tial disclosures of line of business information). 
44 This is consistent with the view that securities prices change in response to firm 
specific information due mostly to risk arbitrage. See Kenneth R. French & Richard 
Roll, Stock Return Variances: The Arrival of Information and the Reaction of Trad-
ers, 17 J. Fin. Econ. 5, 5–6 (Sept. 1986); Richard Roll, R2, 43 J. Fin. 541, 541–42 (1988). 
Fairly dramatic evidence of such a result was captured in a recent study of German 
companies that switched to the more rigorous reporting standards of GAAP or Inter-
national Accounting Standards. Those switching considerably narrowed the bid-ask 
spread for their securities, a result consistent with investors’ perceiving less risk with 
the information released by the switching firms. See Christian Leuz & Robert E. Ver-
recchia, The Economic Consequences of Increased Disclosure, 38 J. Acct. Res. 91, 93 
(Supp. 2000) (finding spreads were reduced and trading volume increased for German 
firms switching from their home country reporting standard to either IAS or GAAP); 
see also Brian J. Bushee & Christian Leuz, Economic Consequences of SEC Disclo-
sure Regulation: Evidence from the OTC Bulletin Board, 39 J. Acct. & Econ. 233, 236 
(2005) (noting that Over-The-Counter Bulletin Board traded firms that complied with 
the new requirement that they also become an SEC reporting company experienced a 
sharp increase in liquidity and returns versus those that failed to meet this require-
ment). 
 It should also be noted that changes in a securities return is not the only effect that 
one can expect with increased or reduced disclosure. Reduced levels of liquidity also 
are associated with lower disclosing firms. See, e.g., Thomas E. Copeland & Dan 
Galai, Information Effects on the Bid-Ask Spread, 38 J. Fin. 1457 (1983); Lawrence 
R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Mar-
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The lemons problem comes into bold relief when we consider 
mutual recognition in the context of GAAP versus IFRS, particu-
larly if this choice is available to domestic issuers as well as foreign 
issuers. As seen earlier, GAAP and IFRS are not mirror images of 
one another. Distinct differences exist in numerous areas bearing 
on the measurement of central financial reporting items. More im-
portantly, the hallmark of IFRS is that the metrics for so many of 
its provisions are principles-based as contrasted with more specific 
rules-based proscriptions. This translates to greater indefiniteness 
in reporting results even among IFRS-compliant members since 
greater discretion is incorporated into the reporting standard, caus-
ing outcomes to vary across reporting companies. This introduces 
an interesting separation continuum among IFRS-compliant issu-
ers. 
To illustrate, consider variations on the preceding hypothetical 
where the host market has an equal number of GAAP compliant 
firms (G firms) and IFRS compliant firms (I firms). Within each of 
these two sets of firms, there are G and G’ firms and I and I’ firms 
with the difference being that the G and I firms’ intrinsic value is 
$22 and the G’ and I’ firms have intrinsic values of $20. Because we 
further assume that compliance with GAAP effectively distin-
guishes the G from the G’ firms, each will be accurately priced at 
their intrinsic values, $22 and $20, respectively. However, because 
IFRS’s principles-based orientation provides greater laxity around 
what appears in the ultimate reporting of each firm’s financial per-
formance and position, investors lack the information to distin-
guish the I from the I’ firms so that I firm’s will be underpriced and 
I’ will be overpriced. To be sure, this may cause I firms to migrate 
to GAAP, but for reasons set forth earlier, their firm’s managers 
ket with Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14 J. Fin. Econ. 71 (1985). See generally 
Albert S. Kyle, Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading, 53 Econometrica 1315 
(1985). 
 More generally, high disclosure quality yields lower costs of capital. See Partha Sen-
gupta, Corporate Disclosure Quality and the Cost of Debt, 73 Acct. Rev. 459, 459–60 
(1998) (noting that firms with a higher disclosure quality score were observed to have 
110 basis points lower bond interest than firms having weakest disclosure score); Mi-
chael Welker, Disclosure Policy, Information Asymmetry, and Liquidity in Equity 
Markets, 11 Contemp. Acct. Res. 801, 803, 811 (1995) (displaying a study of 427 firms 
in twenty-eight industries, finding that spreads were 50% greater for firms ranked in 
the lowest third by disclosure score versus those ranked in the highest third). 
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may avoid making the switch. It is into this world that the desirabil-
ity of choice, in this case GAAP versus IFRS, should be assessed 
against the historical objectives of securities regulations. 
There are four well-recognized interrelated objectives sought to 
be achieved by mandatory disclosure requirements of the securities 
laws. Each objective reflects the regulator’s fear that his interven-
tion is necessary to address a harmful market failure. First, manda-
tory disclosure is believed necessary to provide investors with in-
formation they need to make informed intelligent investment 
decisions.45 Stated simply, absent mandatory disclosure require-
ments, investors will not receive the information they need to as-
sess competing investment opportunities; the information they do 
receive will vary widely across issuers so that comparability among 
them is not practicable.46 A core feature of this objective is compa-
rability among investment choices, at least with respect to choices 
among securities competing for the investor’s funds. Comparability 
implicates the scope and detail, and to a lesser extent its presenta-
tion format, of the information the regulator requires all issuers to 
disclose. Second, securities laws seek to enhance the allocational 
function of capital markets.47 Adam Smith’s invisible hand is be-
45 See, e.g., Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regu-
lation 5–7 (2003), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf (listing 
among objectives protecting investors, fair, efficient, and transparent markets, and 
reducing systemic risk); Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role 
of Securities Regulation, 55 Duke. L.J. 711, 737–39 (2006) (stating that the goal of se-
curities laws is the efficient allocation of resources, which depends on disclosure-
enabling information traders to act in an informed manner). 
46 Note that investors may overcome some initial lack of comparability with the aid 
of information from other sources and additional effort (for example, to overcome 
differences in methodology used by issuers) to make meaningful comparisons. See, 
e.g., Shyam Sunder, Stock Price and Risk Related to Accounting Changes in Inven-
tory Valuation, 50 Acct. Rev. 305, 312–14 (1975) (switching to higher cost LIFO from 
FIFO is not associated with any significant observable changes in firm’s stock price). 
For this type of disclosure issue, the utility of mandating uniformity is to put upon the 
issuer the cost of uniformity in the belief this will result in lower overall costs vis-à-vis 
the collective costs of numerous investors undertaking individual efforts to acquire 
the same information. 
47 See Merritt B. Fox, Company Registration and the Private Placement Exemption, 
51 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 455, 458–60 (2001) (asserting that the primary goal of securi-
ties regulation is efficiency in pricing cost of capital as it relates to the individual 
firm’s selection of new investment projects); Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 45, 
at 713 (asserting that the essential function of securities law is to attain efficient re-
source allocation). The connection between mandatory disclosure rules and the allo-
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lieved to operate more effectively if, on the basis of disclosed in-
formation, investors can differentiate risk and return relationships 
among competing opportunities. Mandatory disclosure rules are 
believed to facilitate allocational efficiency because uniform disclo-
sure will lead to sharper comparative judgments respecting the re-
lation of risk and return. Third, mandatory disclosure rules are jus-
tified as a useful prophylactic to reduce the frequency and scale of 
fraudulent offerings and other manipulative practices. The connec-
tion between mandatory disclosure rules and manipulative prac-
tices is illustrated by the pump-and-dump schemes that plague 
penny stock markets.48 A key feature of these schemes is public 
trading in securities of issuers about which there is no reliable pub-
lic information. This permits the unscrupulous promoter to pique 
investor interest through rumors and false reports; with large num-
bers of credulous investors providing upward price momentum for 
the security, the promoter can dispose of her holdings at a substan-
tial profit. Thus, mandatory disclosure rules fill what otherwise 
cational function is easiest to understand with respect to issuer transactions as con-
trasted with trading transactions since issuer transactions are directly linked to the is-
suer’s cost of capital with respect to its present offering. See, e.g., Jack Hirshleifer, 
The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Incentive Activity, 61 
Am. Econ. Rev. 561, 569–70 (1971). Financial theorists also support the link between 
risk-return judgments embodied in trading transactions and the allocation of capital 
among competing investment opportunities. James Tobin, On the Efficiency of the 
Financial System, Lloyds Bank Rev. 1, 5–8 (July 1984) (questioning whether informa-
tionally efficient markets necessarily also reflect fundamental value of the traded se-
curities, but noting more meaningful stock prices plausibly improve allocation of capi-
tal); Artyom Durnev et al., Does Firm-Specific Information in Stock Prices Guide 
Capital Allocation?, 3–4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 8093, Jan. 
2001), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8093 (stating that firms with more 
firm-specific variation in their stock prices are hypothesized to trade in more efficient 
markets and study findings reflect such firms allocate capital with greater precision 
than firms whose securities are not classed as being priced in an efficient market. 
These connections are accepted by many as a fundamental, if even an a priori, step in 
considering regulatory choices. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A 
Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1023, 1032 (2000) (“If the market can effi-
ciently price securities, the market will also efficiently allocate capital investment. . . . 
In order to efficiently price securities, investors must have a constant flow of complete 
and accurate information.”). 
48 Thus, the first level of regulatory response to reducing the frequency of pump-
and-dump schemes is by mandating trading brokers have in their possession reasona-
bly current information for non-exchange listed securities before initiating a trade on 
behalf of a client. See Initiation or Resumption of Quotations Without Specific In-
formation, Exchange Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11 (2008). 
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would be an information void that allows the unscrupulous pro-
moter to carry out her fraudulent scheme. Finally, mandatory dis-
closure both empowers stockholders vis-à-vis the firm’s managers 
and restrains opportunistic behavior by company managers.49 Dis-
closure not only nurtures the managers’ responsiveness to their 
stockholders, certainly in connection with any regulated proxy so-
licitation, but also can attract a bid for control. Additionally, there 
is a fear that in the absence of mandatory disclosure managers will 
time their disclosures so as to maximize gains they can reap 
through insider trading.50 A further fear is that absent reliable in-
formation, managers may capture a disproportionate value of the 
firm through artful timing of going private transactions or other 
forms of restructuring. By providing information regarding the 
company’s performance and its managers’ stewardship in a timely 
manner, mandatory disclosure rules are believed to reduce the fre-
quency of these ill effects. As this Article examines below, most of 
these objectives are adversely affected if IFRS and GAAP are 
permitted in a single market. 
A. Informing Investors 
If the sole objective of securities regulators is facilitating inves-
tors’ ability to make meaningful comparisons among issuers on the 
basis of publicly available information, regulators should be rea-
sonably comfortable with mutual recognition in the GAAP-IFRS 
context, at least if securities are priced in a market that is funda-
mentally efficient. Investor judgments respecting investment op-
portunities are at a socially desirable level of acuity if investors can 
price securities accurately so that any disclosure lacunae of one is-
49 The classic statement of this objective is Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure 
as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1047, 1051, 1077–80 (1995) 
(supporting the view that the goal of securities law is curbing managerial opportunism 
by dominance of management-focused disclosure items in the Securities Act’s Sched-
ule A). But see Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 
1999 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 27–29 (1999) (questioning the efficiency of mandating 
disclosure rules designed to reduce agency costs). 
50 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory 
Disclosure System, 70 Va. L. Rev. 717, 739–41 (1984) (hypothesizing that in the ab-
sence of mandatory disclosure, the popularity of the management leveraged buyout 
would likely increase as managers attempt to appropriate a greater share of the firm’s 
value). 
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suer vis-à-vis another issuer are reflected in a heavier discounting 
of the price of the former over the latter. Importantly, under the 
assumption of fundamentally efficient capital markets, the amount 
of that discount will capture the disclosure risk posed by the lower 
disclosing firm accurately. Here we can see the strong similarity be-
tween the arguments in support of multiple disclosure standards 
and the longer-lasting debate regarding the social benefits of man-
datory disclosure rules. Opponents of mandatory disclosure re-
quirements have argued that mandatory disclosure rules are super-
fluous or at least impose costs in excess of their benefits.51 To such 
critics, the costs of mandatory disclosure rules are unnecessary be-
cause they believe investors in a laissez-faire environment can self-
protect through discounting the returns of issuers based on the 
relative completeness and trustworthiness of their disclosures.52 It is 
also argued that those who advocate mandatory disclosure re-
51 For a review of this debate, see Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, 1 Securities Regula-
tions 171–93 (4th ed. 2006); Coffee, supra note 50, at 717–18; Joel Seligman, The His-
torical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. Corp. L. 1, 1–9 
(1983). 
52 The fount of the empirical battle over the utility of mandatory disclosure rules was 
Professor Stigler’s classic work, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets. George 
J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117 (1964). Professor 
Stigler’s assault was followed by a series of articles by George Bentson arguing that 
mandatory disclosure rules provide no significant protection to investors that were 
not present prior to 1933. See, e.g., George J. Bentson, Required Disclosure and the 
Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 Am. Econ. 
Rev. 132, 151–52 (1973); George J. Bentson, The Value of the SEC’s Accounting Dis-
closure Requirements, 44 Acct. Rev. 515, 531 (1969). The empirical weaknesses and 
overall validity of the findings of Stigler and Bentson have long been the source of 
lively debate and analysis. See, e.g., Irwin Friend & Edward S. Herman, The S.E.C. 
Through a Glass Darkly, 37 J. Bus. 382, 402–03 (1964); Seligman, supra note 51, at 10–
18. Professor Fox has provided a fresh and insightful critique of this work and how the 
data amassed by Professors Stigler and Bentson poorly support their attack on man-
datory disclosure rules. See Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclo-
sure: Why Issuer Choice is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1335, 1369–93 
(1999). There are inherent methodological problems with studies of Depression-era 
markets because of the difficulties of isolating the phenomenon to be examined from 
all the other forces then affecting securities markets. A useful focus for the value of 
mandatory disclosure—because it does not confront such multi-confounding eco-
nomic forces—was the 1964 expansion of mandatory disclosure to over-the-counter 
securities. See Allen Ferrell, Mandatory Disclosure and Stock Returns: Evidence 
from the Over-the-Counter Market, 36 J. Legal Stud. 213, 213–16 (2007) (revealing 
that volatility of over-the-counter stocks to then exchange listed securities declined 
after SEC reporting status was mandated). 
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quirements ignore the incentives managers have to disclose infor-
mation voluntarily.53 Most recently, the axis of this debate has 
shifted. Today, critics, while appearing to accept mandatory disclo-
sure, advocate that issuers should enjoy unrestrained choice of 
which disclosure regime they will employ to satisfy their disclosure 
obligations.54 Thus, we can see there is at best a slender divide be-
tween the arguments of those who question the mandatory disclo-
sure rules and those who champion a multiple disclosure standards 
approach.55 Such similarity is understandable, even predictable, 
53 See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 40, at 682–84. 
54 There is quite an extensive literature on the topic of regulatory choice for securi-
ties laws. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Re-
thinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 903, 904–
08 (1998) (setting forth the argument that issuers should be free to choose which 
body’s law will guide its disclosures); Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 
83 Va. L. Rev. 1453, 1453–56 (1997) (arguing that exchanges, not the SEC, should 
regulate disclosure since they are in a better position to understand and be responsive 
to competing needs of buyers and sellers); Palmiter, supra note 49, at 4–5 (supporting 
issuer choice conditioned on continuing application of general anti-fraud provision); 
Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regula-
tion, 107 Yale L.J. 2359, 2361 (1998) (suggesting that state, not federal, regulation 
should dictate the demands of mandatory disclosure). To the extent each of these ap-
proaches invites choice on the part of the individual firm’s managers, it likely invites 
opportunistic choices on the part of managers that may not always be guided by the 
interests of the firm. See Amir N. Licht, Genie In A Bottle? Assessing Managerial 
Opportunism in International Securities Transactions, 2000 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 51, 
88–89 (2000) (reviewing evidence that managers frequently pursue where to seek a 
listing with a healthy regard to the managers’ interests). On the broader question of 
the desirability of issuer choice, see James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Secu-
rities Markets, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1200, 1237–44 (1999) (maintaining that multiple 
standards in a single market likely would prove unworkable for enforcement); Robert 
A. Prentice, Regulatory Competition in Securities Law: A Dream (That Should Be) 
Deferred, 66 Ohio. St. L.J. 1155, 1155–58 (2005). 
 In the background of whether issuer choice is socially optimal is something of a 
chicken-and-egg problem in that cross-country comparisons of relative benefits and 
costs of particular regulatory schemes must deal with the problem that social welfare 
is fed by a wider range of inputs than simply the strength of a particular country’s se-
curities laws. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Rents and their Corporate Consequences, 53 
Stan. L. Rev. 1463, 1464–65 (2001) (linking labor laws, ownership concentration, and 
competition to governance norms adhered to by a public company). 
55 Fox summarizes this point: 
 The proponents of issuer choice . . . . [O]ffer a different alternative to manda-
tory disclosure from the one presented by its earlier opponents. Mandatory dis-
closure’s early critics would have allowed issuers to be bound by no regime. 
Romano and Choi and Guzman, on the other hand, would require each issuer 
to follow some disclosure scheme but would permit the issuer to choose which 
one. This new alternative to mandatory disclosure, however, shares with the old 
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since, if markets are fundamentally efficient, investors do not need 
the paternalism provided by the costly mandatory disclosure re-
quirements to price securities appropriately.56 While the purpose 
here is not to review the debate on the necessity of mandatory dis-
closure requirements, it is relevant to place that debate within the 
context of multiple disclosure standards. 
To be sure, in a market that is fundamentally efficient, if the goal 
is solely to facilitate comparability, the life of the securities regula-
tor would be a quiet one. The classic goal of facilitating informed 
investment decisions would reduce the regulator to the rather me-
nial task of making sure that issuers disclosed enough information 
so that investors are aware of the nature of the disclosure differ-
ences among issuers.57 Thus, in evaluating issuers G, G’, I, and I’, 
the role of the securities regulator would be to assure that the dis-
closure differences among the four issuers were adequately dis-
alternative at least one core feature: Each grants issuers substantial freedom to 
choose their own disclosure levels. 
Fox, supra note 52, at 1340. 
56 The divide that separates advocates of multiple disclosure standards from those 
who favor the host market setting minimum standards for its markets is based on a 
belief that managers will not eagerly volunteer information when it does not maxi-
mize their own utility to do so. Support for the latter is found in the numerous studies 
that have examined the behavior of managers in the one area where voluntary disclo-
sure is the norm: the proffering of financial forecasts. Studies of financial forecasts 
consistently reflect the grave reluctance of managers to disclose unexpected bad news. 
Not only is there evidence that managers systematically delay the release of unex-
pected bad news forecasts, but managers also systematically time their purchases and 
sales of their company’s securities so as to reap significant insider trading profits 
based on their private knowledge of the information to be disclosed in the financial 
forecasts. For a review of the studies, see James D. Cox, Insider Trading Regulation 
and the Production of Information: Theory and Evidence, 64 Wash. U. L.Q. 475, 492–
95 (1986). In light of such analogous evidence, we might speculate on just what we 
would expect to find in a world without mandatory disclosure requirements with re-
spect to any type of information. Here, our expectations are informed by insights 
from the behavioral sciences, and we could reasonably conclude that the incentives 
needed to cause managers to disclose information are driven upward by the so-called 
“status quo bias,” which naturally exists and causes greater rewards to be expected to 
change behavior from the norm believed to be acceptable. Thus, if the norm is that of 
voluntary disclosure, much greater incentives must be provided to managers to en-
courage disclosure than in a world in which mandatory disclosure is the norm. See 
Bainbridge, supra note 47, at 1048. 
57 Regulators would, of course, continue to have an important role in prosecuting 
fraudulent or manipulative practices. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 40, 
678–80. 
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cernible so that these pricing differences would occur.58 By so act-
ing, the regulator can rest assured that at least one of the objectives 
of securities regulations has been satisfied. 
B. Allocational Efficiency 
As seen earlier, in the host market where X and Y trade, the se-
curities regulator contributes to allocation efficiency59 by mandat-
ing line of business reporting. This occurred under the example be-
cause disclosure of revenues and profits for the issuer’s line of 
businesses caused X and Y Issuers’ prices to separate so that each 
type of issuer would be priced at its intrinsic value. Now consider 
the impact of the entry of I and I’. Their presence returns mispric-
ing to the host market because, at least for these two securities, 
they either will be under- or over-priced.60 At the same time, both I 
and I’ are riskier than G and G’ since their expected value is the 
combination of their future potential outcomes, which have a 
greater variance than for G or G’. Investors will not shy away from 
purchasing either I or I’, provided the expectation of accurately 
identifying which stock is I and reaping a $1 gain is sufficient com-
pensation for the risk involved in making that investment choice. 
To illustrate the connection with allocational efficiency, assume 
that each of the four issuers will undertake a public offering of 50 
million shares. The distribution will therefore result in I’ receiving 
$50 million more than its U.S. match, G’; and I receives $50 million 
less than its U.S. match, G.61 The regulator will view the loser in 
this process as not solely I but the host country’s investors who 
58 Professors Choi and Guzman would call upon the regulators to assure there was 
minimal disclosure of any disclosure differences. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 54, 
at 926 (“Domestic lawmakers . . . may place a duty on broker-dealers to notify inves-
tors of the law governing transactions in a particular company’s securities.”). 
59 For a tightly developed argument concerning why a market that is fundamentally 
efficient will not necessarily lead to allocational efficiency because managers may 
themselves misinterpret the risks and returns of business opportunities, see Jeffrey N. 
Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securi-
ties Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 761, 767–69 (1985). 
60 See supra text accompanying note 44. 
61 Readers are reminded of the earlier stated assumption that share prices are effi-
ciently priced in light of information that is publicly available. Thus, I indeed has an 
intrinsic value greater than the value embedded in its market price because the mar-
ket price does not reflect the private information that would call for a higher market 
valuation. 
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chose I’ over the other three investment choices. The regulator has 
good cause to believe that if all issuers selling securities within its 
jurisdiction abided by its mandatory disclosure rules that there 
would have been more accurate pricing of the issued securities and 
investors could have better maximized their investment return. 
And, assuming that capital is not unlimited, some issuers may have 
been able to distribute more of their own securities if there had 
been a level disclosure field since factors disclosed per GAAP may 
reflect greater future risks for I and I’ than for other capital-hungry 
issuers.62
Accurate securities prices also affect the disciplining effects of 
the market for control, which has its own impact on the role that 
securities markets play in the allocation of capital. Mandatory dis-
closure rules enhance the likelihood that managers who perform 
poorly by making suboptimal uses of the resources under their con-
trol will be displaced. Those who replace them can be expected to 
better deploy the firm’s resources. Thus, if the cause of differences 
between I and I’ issuers is that I firms have talented managers and 
I’ do not, the pricing of I firms so that they are indistinguishable 
from I’ firms will mean I’ managers will continue to be immune 
from the disciplining effects of a takeover or proxy contest so that 
I’ firms’ resources will continue to be misallocated.63
62 For the view that price inaccuracy in the host market has ill effects only for the 
home country of the foreign issuer, see Merritt B. Fox, The Securities Globalization 
Disclosure Debate, 78 Wash. U. L.Q. 567, 579 (2000). Since the issuers compete for 
capital against one another, to the extent regulation creates advantages for one group 
of issuers over another competing group of issuers, it is hard to understand why the ill 
effects would not be felt in the host country if it is their issuers who are disadvantaged 
by the competitive advantage given to the foreign issuers. Moreover, if the foreign is-
suer uses the proceeds so raised for expansion of its operations in the host country, 
then to the extent that one were persuaded to focus narrowly by Professor Fox’s call 
essentially to “follow the money,” the effects of the advantage would be even more 
clearly felt in the host country. 
63 Thus, we would find that if bidders could not distinguish X’ from Y’ issuers, the 
effect would be to insulate underperforming firms from takeovers since their securi-
ties are overpriced. This problem may well be de minimis in the host market, because 
an insignificant percentage of the company’s securities are traded within the host 
market in contrast with its home market. The disciplining effects of takeovers can 
therefore be seen as a governance issue that is traditionally commended to the home 
market. Although there may be some unequal treatment of investors in the host mar-
ket, the same de minimis considerations can cause regulators to permit departure 
from the host market’s traditional rules regulating the conduct of tender offers as the 
regulator balances the benefits of those rules versus the social cost of bidders structur-
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Thus, under a mutual recognition-multiple standards approach, 
the well-meaning regulator loses its ability to influence the alloca-
tion of capital. Even G’ Issuers may suffer because investors are at-
tracted to the prospects of the rewards of identifying an I Issuer by 
the fifty percent odds of acquiring an IFRS reporting firm at $21 
that becomes a $22 security. Domestic issuers lose; indeed, all issu-
ers lose if investment funds are diverted to lower disclosing firms. 
As developed above, the lower disclosing firms pose greater risk, 
but their greater risk will not prevent them from attracting capital 
if investors perceive the reward of accurately picking an X class is-
suer. And, the lower disclosing firms’ managers also face a reduced 
likelihood of being disciplined by the market for control.64 Each ef-
fect interferes with the regulators’ quest to enhance allocational ef-
ficiency in their market. 
C. Reduction of Fraudulent Offerings 
The securities regulator’s role in deterring fraudulent offerings 
occurs on two fronts: ex ante through mandating disclosures that 
reduce the likelihood65 of such an offering occurring66 and ex post 
ing their tender offer so as to foreclose participation by investors outside the target’s 
home market. This thinking is reflected in the SEC’s rules regarding cross-border 
tender offers involving non-domestic issuers. See Scope of and Definitions Applicable 
to Regulations 14D and 14E, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1(b) (2001). See generally Jill E. 
Fisch, Imprudent Power: Reconsidering U.S. Regulation of Foreign Tender Offers, 87 
Nw. U. L. Rev. 523, 523–25 (1993). 
64 A key component of the argument that managers should be completely passive in 
the face of a hostile takeover of their company is the view that the target company’s 
shares are priced efficiently. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The 
Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1161, 1161–64 (1981). 
65 By requiring certification of financial statements and even expert opinions from 
other outside experts, such as attorneys, on matters relevant to an offering of securi-
ties, and by imposing on each not only liability for reasonable care with respect to 
such undertaking, but also liability under the anti-fraud provision in all securities 
transactions, mandatory disclosure essentially conscripts independent professionals to 
the role of gate keepers, thus providing a separate counterforce to fraudulent offer-
ings. 
66 Professor Stigler’s analysis of performance relative to a market index of securities 
offered between 1949 and 1955, compared with those offered between 1923 and 1928, 
led him to conclude that an ill effect of mandatory disclosure is the systematic exclu-
sion of risky companies from public markets. Stigler, supra note 52, at 122. Such ex-
clusion is seen more positively by others who conclude that the greater disclosure and 
verification that was introduced by the securities laws had the natural effect of permit-
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enforcement of applicable antifraud provisions so that the sanc-
tions imposed upon fraudsters will deter others from engaging in 
fraudulent securities offerings. Superficially, the embrace of dual 
reporting standards would not appear to have an adverse impact 
on the securities regulator’s important role of deterring fraudulent 
offerings through its enforcement of applicable antifraud provi-
sions. It would seem that the sanctions to be applied would be 
those of the host country so one could expect that the sting of the 
enforcement efforts would not be diminished.67 However, on closer 
analysis, deterrence will be affected to the extent the principles-
based approach of IFRS has the effect of making violations more 
difficult for regulators to both detect and prosecute successfully. 
Indeed, those who call for principles-based regulation do so with 
an equally forceful call that regulation should be prudential, that is, 
not enforcement oriented.68 Consequently, any substantive ambigu-
ity or weaknesses in IFRS will carry forward to the enforcement 
actions by the host regulators and will weaken the deterrent effects 
of its enforcement actions. As a consequence, fraud will occur with 
greater frequency if issuers can opt for weaker disclosure standards 
so that the host country is hobbled in deterring the occurrence of 
fraud because the selected regime’s laws provide weaker enforce-
ment procedures and powers than do the host country’s laws. 
Moreover, the assumption that offerings will be priced efficiently 
does not protect investors from fraudulent offerings. This pricing 
assumption assumes disclosure of enough information so that in-
vestors can appropriately discount the purchased security by the 
disclosure risks it presents. Fraudulently offered securities by defi-
nition will be indistinguishable from other securities, except that 
securities opting for more rigorous disclosure regimes pose a lower 
risk of fraud than those securities choosing a less rigorous disclo-
sure regime. To be sure, investors can be expected to impound in 
their pricing decisions the average risk of fraud for all securities. 
ting fewer risky offerings since the enhanced disclosure that risky issuers had to make 
could be expected to cause investors not to purchase their offerings, and thus discour-
age the would-be issuers from making the offering at all. See Friend & Herman, supra 
note 52, at 390–91. 
67 See Cox, supra note 54, at 1239–43. 
68 See Comm. on Capital Mkts. Regulation, The Competitive Position of the U.S. 
Public Equity Market (2007), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org’pdfs/ 
The_Competitive_Position_of_the_US_Public_Equity_Market.pdf. 
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Such an averaging, however, is a tricky, and most likely indetermi-
nate, calculation. Theoretically, investors should divide securities 
according to the disclosure regime each has opted to use and dis-
count each security within the group by the average risk of fraud 
posed by all securities in that group. So viewed, this risk is system-
atic so that it cannot be diversified away; the larger and more di-
verse one’s portfolio, the closer the portfolio’s overall risk of hold-
ing fraudulent offering will be to the risk of fraud in the market as 
a whole. 
The significance of the risk of a fraudulent offering not being a 
diversifiable risk is that when the well-diversified investor has the 
misfortune (statistically predictable though it is) to hold a fraudu-
lently offered security that becomes worthless, or nearly so, the in-
vestor’s loss is not recouped from the other securities in the inves-
tor’s portfolio. Each of the remaining securities remain subject to 
the disclosure risks that were embedded in them when the investor 
acquired them and those disclosure risks will cause them to carry 
the same discount for their respective disclosure risks when resold 
by the investor. That is, the result of holding a diversified portfolio 
is not like squeezing a balloon, where pressure at one spot causes 
an equal expansion at another location. This merely reflects the 
well-recognized principle that the presence of fraudulent offerings 
that cannot be detected ex ante through prevailing disclosure pro-
cedures lowers the value of all offerings. At the same time, the risk 
being systematic does lead to all investors expecting compensation 
for their bearing this risk; thus, the expected return for investors is 
greater than if this risk were not present. Stated differently, much 
like the rising tide that lifts all boats, fraudulent offerings that can-
not be identified ex ante raise the cost of capital for all issuers. This 
increases the cost of capital for all companies issuing securities; but 
when one considers that companies that raise capital by issuing se-
curities compete with other investor opportunities that do not raise 
funds in securities markets and that involve no risk of managerial 
oppression, one can also see its effects on the efficient allocation of 
investment dollars.69
69 See James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Response to the “Chicago 
School,” 1986 Duke L.J. 628, 635–42.  
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The securities regulator seeking to prevent fraudulent securities 
offerings ex ante in a multiple disclosure standards approach faces 
a very circumscribed agenda. Powerless to regulate substantive dis-
closures of issuers opting to be governed by another disclosure re-
gime, the most the regulator can hope to accomplish is to inform 
investors of the greater likelihood of fraud associated with the dis-
closure regime selected by an issuer. This course is similar to that 
discussed earlier in terms of the host regulator’s task in facilitating 
the efficient pricing of securities so that differences in disclosure 
practices are impounded in the security’s price. The most that can 
be accomplished through such generic warnings is to cause each 
purchased security to be priced at an amount that reflects the aver-
age risk of fraud among securities opting for that particular disclo-
sure regime. But as seen above, even so discounted, if the investor 
experiences a loss from a fraudulent offering, the magnitude of that 
loss is not offset by discounts for the other securities in the inves-
tor’s portfolio. 
D. Managerial Responsiveness to Owners and Opportunistic 
Behavior 
Mandatory disclosure rules are also a central component of cor-
porate governance. For example, proxy voting for public U.S. cor-
porations is conditioned upon the proxy solicitor making extensive 
disclosure of information germane to shareholders exercising in-
formed decisions when executing their proxies.70 Absent such dis-
closures, shareholders would be left to the weak disclosure re-
quirements of state law and the vagaries of fiduciary-based 
disclosure duties of directors and controlling stockholders.71 Fed-
eral disclosure requirements overcome these weaknesses so that 
managers approach the proxy season with a healthy understanding 
that their stewardship in the prior fiscal period must be adequately 
70 The disclosures that must be satisfied by a U.S. reporting company in connection 
with the election of directors is set forth in Schedule 14A. Also, there is the further 
requirement that management’s solicitations relating to a meeting at which directors 
will be elected must be accompanied by an annual report to shareholders. See Infor-
mation to be furnished to Security Holders, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b) (2008). 
71 See generally James D. Cox & Thomas Lee Hazen, 1 Cox & Hazen on Corpora-
tions 542–45 (2d ed. 2003) (reviewing basis for officers’ and directors’ disclosure obli-
gations and the limited enforcement options available for their breach). 
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disclosed in their proxy materials. Among the disclosures com-
pelled by any SEC filing requirement are detailed revelations re-
garding various self-dealing transactions between the corporation 
and its promoters, managers, or controlling stockholders,72 includ-
ing extensive information regarding executive compensation.73 The 
securities laws’ requirement that the annual financial statements be 
independently audited is a further effort to provide owners with a 
neutral perspective of management’s stewardship.74 In this way, 
many of the disclosures required to accompany management’s 
proxy solicitation materials mirror disclosures mandated by the 
home country’s periodic disclosure requirements. A major objec-
tive of periodic disclosure requirements is to overcome the fear 
that, absent such mandated disclosures, financially important in-
formation would not be released until the managers had reaped for 
themselves the financial benefits of that information by trading in 
their company’s securities before releasing the information.75 With-
out adequate disclosure of information bearing on the value of the 
firm, managers can, through self-dealing transactions and going 
private transactions, abuse their insider positions by capturing a 
disproportionate share of any undisclosed future gains of the firm.76 
To the extent that IFRS results in greater price inaccuracy than is 
the case for issuers complying with GAAP, does this necessarily 
compromise the securities regulator’s role in addressing managerial 
opportunism? 
72 See Transactions with Related Persons, Promoters and Certain Control Persons, 
17 C.F.R. § 229.404 (2008) (detailing disclosures required for related party transac-
tions exceeding $120,000). 
73 See Executive Compensation, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2008) (calling for specific in-
formation to be disclosed on a wide range of benefits to senior executives, but also 
containing principles-based guidance on annual compensation disclosure and analysis 
of executive compensation). 
74 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.2-01–210.2-02 (setting forth detailed requirements respecting 
the auditor’s independence and the content of the auditor’s opinion respecting the 
reporting company’s financial statements). 
75 See generally Cox, supra note 56, at 477 (reviewing weaknesses in incentives for 
managers to voluntarily release financially significant information). 
76 See Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Secu-
rities Markets, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 781, 782–85 (2001) (concluding that the better the 
overall financial disclosure regime, the harder it is for self-dealing to be concealed); 
see also supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text. 
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Allowing issuers to report their financial performance and posi-
tion in accordance with IFRS rather than GAAP would not obvi-
ate the extensive disclosures public companies must satisfy that are 
directed specifically toward transactions rife with opportunities for 
managerial opportunism. Not only would SEC registrants still have 
to provide extensive information for various self-dealing transac-
tions, but they would also have to comply with requirements for 
the company to have an independent auditor review the financial 
statements and under the watchful eye of an audit committee 
staffed with directors free of financial links to the firm’s manage-
ment. In combination, these requirements provide an important 
firewall between the firm’s assets and temptations managers may 
have to appropriate to themselves any portion of the firm’s value 
that is not otherwise known. 
Nonetheless, permitting managers to opt for disclosure standards 
understood to provide them with greater discretion in the timing of 
revenues and expenses and the measurement of assets and liabili-
ties provides serious temptations for those inclined to act opportu-
nistically. Simply stated, the greater the price inaccuracy permitted 
by a disclosure regime, the greater will be the temptations for man-
agers to use the inaccuracies to their advantage. 
E. Synopsis 
We find, therefore, that in a market assumed sufficiently effi-
cient to price the lacunae that prevail between GAAP and IFRS, 
nearly all the objectives traditionally associated with securities 
regulation stand substantially qualified.77 Only the objective of 
77 The assumption made in this Article that capital markets are fundamentally effi-
cient is not a strong one. There is abundant evidence that conditions that would char-
acterize such markets do not exist. See Eugene F. Fama, Market Efficiency, Long-
Term Returns, and Behavioral Finance, 49 J. Fin. Econ. 283, 285–88 (1998). Even 
studies that reject the hypothesis that securities markets are fundamentally efficient, 
however, are not inconsistent with the belief that securities prices respond rapidly to 
financially significant information. This state of efficiency, referred to here as securi-
ties markets being informationally efficient, poses a more difficult environment for 
justifying a multiple disclosure standards approach under the traditional objectives of 
securities regulation. 
 To illustrate the functioning of an informationally efficient market, return to the 
earlier illustration of two firms, X and Y, where without line of business information 
investors are unable to distinguish the higher valued X firms ($22) from the lower 
valued Y firms ($20). Investors estimate the value based upon broad sets of informa-
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tion bearing on each firm’s past, present, and future performance. In a market that is 
only informationally efficient, investors will have heterogeneous expectations regard-
ing what to make of each bit of information within these sets so that the security’s re-
sulting price will reflect their ranging estimates. See Lynn A. Stout, How Efficient 
Markets Undervalue Stocks: CAPM and ECMH Under Conditions of Uncertainty 
and Disagreement, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 475 (1997). Thus, it is not possible to con-
clude, as we did earlier, that in an informationally efficient market investors would, 
absent line of business information, price X and Y securities at their combined weight 
of $21. Instead, investors can be expected to disagree about the value of X and/or Y 
firms generally so that the security’s price will reflect—most likely on an on-going ba-
sis—their disagreement whether the intrinsic value of X shares is greater or less than 
$22. Similar disagreements will occur for Firm Y shares. Thus, investors in an infor-
mationally efficient market will not price X and Y shares at $21 when they cannot dis-
tinguish X from Y firms; instead, each share will be priced in a range around $21 per 
share. The breadth of that range will be directly related to the degree to which their 
expectations diverge. 
 Here we should further consider the impact of a new compelled disclosure, such as 
the line of business disclosure in the illustration. A new disclosure requirement of fi-
nancially significant information in an informationally efficient market will likely 
elicit varying judgments among investors regarding that information’s impact on a se-
curity’s price. Widely varying assessments of the new information’s impact will be lay-
ered onto the already varying assessments of the firm’s risk and return that were 
formed on the basis of information already available to the public before the new dis-
closure. Thus, what we observe with the release of financially significant information 
are security prices that reflect the price changes of such heterogeneous expectations. 
 Just how satisfying is the life of the securities regulator in a world in which securities 
prices do not, on average, reflect their intrinsic value? The answer is a crisp “not 
very” if securities prices bear no observable relationship to the public disclosure of 
financially significant information. In such a world, the costs of disclosure would be 
hard to justify since the conclusion that disclosure bears no relationship to securities 
price changes would suggest that mandatory disclosure has only negative social wel-
fare implications. In fact, regulatory efforts produce a social benefit if they change in-
vestor expectations such that securities prices change in response to their reaction to 
the release of information even though the resulting prices do not reflect intrinsic 
value, provided the price change is in the direction of the security’s intrinsic value. 
That is, prices over- and under-react but over time migrate toward a security’s intrin-
sic value. Thus, we can see that the security regulator’s life is a satisfying one, even if 
the markets are only informationally efficient. 
 As seen above, even in an informationally efficient market, the disclosure of line of 
business information can be expected to move the price of G and G’ securities from 
their composition price—a price that ranges around $21—toward their respective in-
trinsic value. The information therefore sharpens the risk and return assessments 
posed by each security. An important policy question confronts the host regulator if I 
and I’ securities trade in the same market as do G and G’, and the former disclosures 
are guided by IFRS. In an informationally efficient market, investors cannot be ex-
pected to price the effect of stronger or weaker disclosure requirements accurately. 
With respect to a security whose issuer chooses to abide by materially weaker disclo-
sure requirements, we would expect the rational investor to view such a security as 
presenting a greater inherent risk and to take this into account in pricing the security 
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so as to garner a return expected to compensate for the totality of the security’s risks. 
The policy question this raises for the host country’s securities regulator is whether 
there is a net social benefit of permitting this new variable. To be sure, investors will 
be able to make sharper comparisons if all issuers are bound by the same disclosure 
rules as apply to G and G’. Permitting I and I’ to adopt different disclosure require-
ments will result in their prices reflecting greater uncertainty respecting their intrinsic 
value than will occur for the securities of G and G’. More important, investors in a 
market that is only informationally efficient cannot be expected to price accurately 
the differences in relative risk between, on the one hand I and I’, and on the other 
hand, G and G’. Just as the objective of comparability was advanced when the securi-
ties regulator imposed line of business disclosure requirements with the intended ef-
fect of sharpening the distinction between X and Y, the objective is undercut if I and 
I’ can enter U.S. markets without complying with line of business requirements. Sim-
ply put, there is no comparability when issuers can provide different levels of disclo-
sure that cannot be reduced to differences that can be accurately reflected in differ-
ences in value. 
 In an informationally efficient market, disclosure requirements that cause a security 
to trade closer to its intrinsic value or reduce the variance around its intrinsic value 
necessarily allow investors to make sharper comparisons among investment opportu-
nities. However, a disclosure standard that causes uncertainty regarding a security’s 
risk and return does not enhance investors’ comparative judgments, but rather re-
duces the allocational efficiency of the host markets so that this objective of securities 
regulation is frustrated. This can be expected to occur because the greater the vari-
ance in the price at which I and I’ trade vis-à-vis G and G’ the more likely that the ex-
pected returns associated with I and I’ securities will be inappropriately matched with 
their risk. In a market that is not fundamentally efficient, this greater variance will not 
be reflected accurately in the price of any of the securities. The ability of I and I’ firms 
to employ weaker disclosure requirements in the host market necessarily will have an 
adverse impact on that market’s allocational functioning. 
 As we saw earlier, the securities regulator’s quest to protect its market’s investors 
from fraudulent offerings is an objective that is thwarted by an issuer’s ability to use 
the weaker disclosure requirements of another nation. This result is all the more pre-
sent when securities markets cannot price the likelihood or magnitude of the potential 
fraud accurately because the market is only informationally efficient. In such a mar-
ket, the regulator seeks to protect host country investors by exposing the offering to 
disclosure and certification processes that will reduce the offering being made in the 
host market. Here the deterrence effects of mandatory disclosure rules and their ac-
companying certification procedures are unaffected by whether the market accurately 
reflects the individual security’s intrinsic value. Fraudulent offerings are less likely to 
occur and their issuers’ reputationally conscious accountants, lawyers, and underwrit-
ers are less likely to participate in offerings whose disclosures indicate or strongly 
suggest the likelihood that they are fraudulent. With the option of such issuers to use 
in the host country another country’s weaker disclosure requirements, investors in an 
informationally efficient market will not be able to price the likelihood of the fraudu-
lent offering. Hence, there is no assurance that over time their losses in connection 
with such offerings will be compensated by the discounts they have demanded in all 
such offerings. With their inability to price this risk accurately, the investors may over 
time be net gainers or losers. 
COX_BOOK_CORRECTED 6/9/2009 6:21 PM 
2009] Coping in a Global Marketplace 975 
 
comparability is satisfied if investors are able ex ante to price the 
differences between the two financial disclosure regimes accu-
rately; this no doubt reflects a tautology since comparability itself 
calls for just such accurate pricing of the differences, which is em-
bedded in the assumption of fundamental efficiency. That the 
other objectives are not satisfied when weaker and stronger stan-
dards prevail in a single market invites the next question ad-
dressed: how should the SEC respond, particularly in light of the 
unrelenting and overtaking forces of globalization? 
III. WHY DON’T THEY EAT CAKE 
With the assumption that investors can price the lacunae be-
tween GAAP and IFRS accurately, the SEC may envision that its 
role is to sharpen investor awareness of the differences that persist 
between these two reporting metrics so that investors can better 
engage in price protection. As seen earlier in Section II.A., this in-
deed is the strategy recommended if the sole objective of the secu-
rities regulator is to facilitate comparison among investors. Thus, if 
comparability were the sole issue, the SEC could fulfill its regula-
tory mandate by not terminating issuer’s use of GAAP, but rather 
by allowing issuers to choose between GAAP and IFRS, provided 
ample disclosure of the generic differences that exist between the 
two reporting regimes was presented. As developed above, how-
ever, even a price protection strategy on the part of investors will 
not fulfill the objectives of facilitating allocational efficiency, re-
ducing fraudulent offerings, and moderating the temptations for 
managerial overreaching. What then can be the regulatory strategy 
for the SEC short of choosing between these two competing re-
gimes? 
Another dimension of investor education that is frequently 
counseled is encouraging investors to maintain well-diversified 
 Finally, when investors cannot self-protect by pricing securities accurately to reflect 
the expected level of managerial misbehavior, non-systematic over- and under-priced 
securities will abound; self-dealing, insider trading, and other opportunistic behavior 
by managers confront investors with a risk that is imperfectly impounded in securities 
prices. Because the risk is not accurately priced, any price adjustment will be imper-
fect and cannot be expected to have the same deterrent effect as would be the case in 
a market that was fundamentally efficient. Thus, the weaker the disclosure standard, 
the weaker the deterrence of managerial overreaching will be. 
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portfolios. The investor advantages for a diversified portfolio are 
well understood. Risk is reduced if investors select investments 
whose returns are not correlated. Thus, the decision of which in-
vestment to acquire, and of which to dispose, is one based not on 
the expected return of that investment, but rather on how that in-
vestment’s addition to the portfolio contributes to the return and 
risk of the portfolio as a whole. Commentators have thoughtfully 
proposed that many a regulatory issue disappears if investors hold 
diversified portfolios.78 For example, Professor Fox concludes that 
in an efficient market, the price of the security should not be af-
fected by disclosure of such firm-specific information because no 
rational investor will pay a premium for a risk that could be ad-
dressed by diversification.79
To examine whether this is a correct understanding of diversifi-
cation of investments that are each priced in an efficient market, 
consider again the social costs and benefits of line of business dis-
closures for the earlier illustration of X and Y. Without this disclo-
sure, both would trade at $21, since investors would be unable to 
distinguish which was a $22 stock (X) and which was a $20 stock 
(Y). Do we really believe that upon disclosure of this line of busi-
ness information—that is, firm-specific information—that no one 
will purchase X shares for more than $21 or that investors will con-
tinue to purchase Y shares at $21? Studies persist in documenting 
78 See, e.g., Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Pro-
posal, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 279, 300–01 (2000) (proposing that unsophisticated investors 
investment options should be confined to index funds); Frank H. Easterbrook & 
Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 Yale L.J. 698, 713–14 (1982) 
(finding that ill effects of majority oppression can be addressed through minority in-
vestors holding diverse portfolios); Merritt B. Fox, Regulation FD and Foreign Issu-
ers: Globalization’s Strains and Opportunities, 41 Va. J. Int’l L. 653, 683–84 (2001) 
(arguing that investors can self-protect against ill effects of selective disclosure 
through efficient diversification). 
79 Fox summarizes his conclusion:  
When more information is available about an issuer, its share price is likely to 
be closer, on one side or the other, to actual value. This enhanced accuracy 
represents a gain to the less than fully diversified investor, because it reduces 
the risk of holding the issuer’s shares in her portfolio. Since the risk that is re-
duced is unsystematic, however, the issuer’s share price will not on average be 
any higher than it would be absent this disclosure—the fundamental lesson of 
the capital asset pricing model. Thus, the issuer’s managers receive no corre-
sponding reward for the benefit enjoyed by the investors.  
Fox, supra note 52, at 1357–58. 
COX_BOOK_CORRECTED 6/9/2009 6:21 PM 
2009] Coping in a Global Marketplace 977 
 
that investors do value firm specific information; the investors’ de-
cisions are reflected in the response of the security’s price to the re-
lease of financially significant information.80 Firm-specific informa-
tion does alter the price of the underlying security, and its 
disclosure can thereby provide social benefits to the host market.81 
Clearly, the evidence that firm-specific information is relevant to 
investors and to the pricing function of markets means that the 
SEC cannot rest on its oars merely by being satisfied that investors 
hold efficient portfolios. 
Moreover, information that is firm-specific may well portend de-
velopments for the firm that become systemic to the firm. For ex-
ample, an increase in profitability of a distinct line of business can 
over time increase internal allocations of resources to that area of 
activity. As a result, the firm’s mix of revenue changes with the 
concomitant effect of altering its overall riskiness vis-à-vis the mar-
ket. The possibility that this information may not be immediately 
visible to investors is indeed one of the justifications for line of 
business reporting, but it also can exist if financial reporting stan-
dards permitted managers to dampen reporting of the successes or 
failures actually occurring within the firm. Even if we assume the 
information to be disclosed does not change the systematic or in-
dustry risk of either X or Y, this information can still be socially 
beneficial (and in turn raises the question of whether the marginal 
social cost of its production exceeds the expected marginally social 
benefit) even though it is firm specific. Finally, large numbers of 
investors are not well diversified, and many that pursue strategies 
that seek to maximize portfolio returns by considering the individ-
ual characteristics of the security, not merely its covariance to the 
market. 
The most fundamental weakness of the portfolio approach is 
that it fails to distinguish between returns and risk when consider-
80 There are many illustrations, but the most pertinent is how investors react to im-
proved disclosure that occurs when, for example, companies use the more demanding 
GAAP or IAS, instead of the less revealing German accounting standards. See 
Bushee & Leuz, supra note 44, at 257–61. 
81 The classic event studies of accounting items repeatedly reflect that firm-specific 
decisions yield firm-specific significant stock price changes for information that is fi-
nancially significant in terms of materially affecting the amount and timing of the 
firm’s cash flow. See, e.g., Robert Kaplan & Richard Roll, Accounting Changes and 
Stock Prices, 29 Fin. Analyst J. 48 (Jan. 1973).  
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ing the benefits of diversification. Adding more stocks to an inves-
tor’s portfolio is a strategy for reducing the random variable within 
the return of individual stocks. The unexpected gains of some 
stocks are offset by the unexpected losses of others. However, to 
the extent that stocks have a common risky characteristic—for ex-
ample, they are all shares in pharmaceutical companies—the more 
pharmaceutical shares that are added to the investor’s portfolio the 
more the risk of the portfolio becomes that of pharmaceutical 
companies generally. In this way, diversification does not render 
the risk equal to zero, but causes the portfolio’s risk to reflect that 
of the dominant group of stocks. Thus, using the examples earlier, 
a portfolio made up of I and I’ securities would have greater risk 
than a portfolio made up of G and G’ securities, where G and G’ 
are understood as being higher disclosing firms than I and I’. Add-
ing more of the latter to the portfolio moves the overall portfolio 
risk toward that of the non-GAAP reporting issuers. 
IV. RETURNING TO ITS ROOTS 
The preceding analysis shows that the SEC, or for that matter its 
foreign counterparts, cannot remain committed to the historical 
objectives of securities regulations merely by public incantations of 
the benefits of investor diversification or by highlighting differ-
ences between GAAP and IFRS. Indeed, the challenges here are 
even more pervasive than the accounting metrics public companies 
will use; the very same global competitive forces that drive regula-
tors toward mutual recognition for accounting standards also call 
for extending commonality with respect to a wide range of disclo-
sure items. Ultimately, regulators must confront, as the SEC is do-
ing today, how to accommodate for all companies non-host country 
disclosure standards. The full implications of globalized offerings 
and trading is the death of the regulator’s sovereignty. How, then, 
does the SEC cope in this world? The answer to this question lurks 
in an understanding of how domestic organizations function in an 
international setting. 
A. Two Views of Making Law in a Globalized Economy 
Though Gaul was divided into three parts, political scientists 
generally fall into two camps regarding their view of the possibili-
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ties of cooperation through international law: the realist perspec-
tive and the liberal/institutionalist perspective. One must regard 
the present territorially oriented approach to securities regulation 
as being reflective of the realist school. Despite the pressures of 
globalization, the realist school believes that a single national stan-
dard for each nation will be the most likely outcome. The realist 
perspective is generally attributed to a reaction to post-World War 
I Wilsonian liberal internationalism. Realists rejected Wilson’s 
embrace of international organizations, such as the League of Na-
tions, as well as the concept of collective security as vehicles to re-
place war and power politics. Realists explained international poli-
tics in terms of antinomy: law versus power; the domestic real 
versus the international unreal; cooperation versus conflict; moral-
ism/idealism/utopianism versus reality.82 Though this may strike 
one as being a bit divorced from the arcane topic of securities regu-
lation, we are drawn closer to these juxtapositions by their unifying 
thesis: nations champion only their own national interests. Incanta-
tions regarding the preeminence of U.S. capital markets and the 
rigors of its regulation are repeatedly joined as justifications for the 
status quo of U.S. regulatory treatment of foreign issuers. Until re-
cently, only isolated accommodations were made for foreign issu-
ers83 and, with the exception of Canadian issuers,84 all had to abide 
82 The founding works of modern realists are Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ 
Crisis, 1919–1939 (2d ed. 1964); George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900–1950 
(1951); Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and 
Peace (5th ed. 1973). For an excellent review of these works and that of others, see 
Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: 
A Dual Agenda, 87 Am. J. Int’l L. 205, 207–14 (1993). 
83 The annual form required of foreign issuers to satisfy the U.S. periodic disclosure 
requirements, Form 20-F, was amended so that it conformed to that embraced by the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions, but the accommodation did 
not change the overall scope and degree of disclosure so required. See International 
Disclosure Standards, Securities Act Release No. 33-7745, 64 Fed. Reg. 53,900, 
53,901, 53,906 (Oct. 5, 1999), reprinted in [1999–2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,208 (Sept. 28, 1999). And, some requirements regarding accounting 
reconciliations to GAAP are relaxed for foreign issuers. See generally James D. Cox 
et al., Securities Regulation 221–23, 551–53 (5th ed. 2006). 
84 See Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modifications to the Current Registration 
and Reporting System for Canadian Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 33-6902, 56 
Fed. Reg. 30,036, 30,036–37 (July 1, 1991), reprinted in [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,812 (June 21, 1991). 
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by the same disclosure standards that pertained to U.S. issuers.85 
The close observer of U.S. positions on transnational securities 
regulatory issues finds resonance in the insights of the leading con-
temporary realist, Professor Kenneth Waltz. He views the organiz-
ing thesis of understanding international relations as that of an an-
archic order because there is no higher government above the 
world’s nations. Within this world, nations are preoccupied with 
power and security issues and international organizations only 
marginally affect prospects of cooperation.86 In the important issue 
of war and peace, the absence of an overarching authority creates 
the void in which fear and distrust among nations abound.87 For the 
more mundane topic of securities regulation, we find the inde-
pendent pursuit of the content of securities regulation. In such a 
world, the realists posit that public policy is guided not by the goal 
of achieving the highest individual payoff from a domestic initia-
tive, but rather “to prevent others from achieving advances in their 
relative capabilities.”88 Simply put, nations are more concerned 
with maintaining their position with an emphasis on preventing 
others from improving their capabilities.89
It is on the last two points that the realist thesis diverges from 
objective evidence of practices pursued by the SEC. Though the 
SEC has a long history of being a relatively inflexible rampart 
against pressures to reduce the rigors of U.S. disclosure standards 
for foreign issuers, it has been anything but obstructionist in the ef-
forts of sister nations to raise their own regulatory standards and 
capabilities. Indeed, an important focus of the SEC has been its in-
teraction with individual nations and international organizations to 
promote their development of regulatory standards that approach 
85 Foreign issuers with shares listed on a U.S. exchange are exempt from U.S. proxy 
disclosure requirements and the short-swing profits filing and disclosure require-
ments. See Exemptions from Sections 14(a), 14(b), 14(c), 14(f) and 16 for Securities 
from Certain Foreign Issuers, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-3 (2008). 
86 See Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (1979). 
87 Id. at 113; Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist 
Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, 42 Int’l Org. 485, 497–98 (1988). 
88 Grieco, supra note 87, at 498; see Carr, supra note 82, at 111; Robert Gilpin, War 
and Change in World Politics 87–88 (1981). 
89 See Grieco, supra note 87, at 499; Emerson M. S. Niou & Peter C. Ordeshook, 
Realism versus Neoliberalism: A Formulation, 35 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 481, 484 (1991). 
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those of the United States.90 At this level, the SEC appears to re-
flect the view of the liberal/institutionalist school that it is possible 
for nations—democracies in particular—to adopt and adhere to in-
ternational or multiple regulatory standards in a sustainable fash-
ion. The rise of transnational corporations and the expansion of in-
ternational trade are among the events that challenge the realist 
view of the continued supremacy of the rules of an individual na-
tion as an instrument of international politics. And, with the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union, security concerns, certainly for devel-
oped countries, were replaced by economic concerns.91
 The focus of the liberal/institutionalist is: 
[how] interactions among states and the development of in-
ternational norms interact with domestic politics of the states 
in an international system so as to transform the way in which 
states define their interests. Transnational and interstate in-
teractions and norms lead to new definitions of interests, as 
well as to new coalition possibilities for different interests 
within states.92
There are important illustrations supporting the hopefulness that 
underlies so much of the cooperative scheme that the lib-
eral/institutionalist believes is possible.93 Among the most powerful 
evidence in favor of the liberal/institutionalist approach is the phe-
nomenon known as the “democratic peace”—in short, the long-
standing, and by now well-tested, observation that established de-
90 See generally James R. Doty, The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion in an Internationalized Marketplace, 60 Fordham L. Rev. S77 (1992); Caroline 
A.A. Greene, Note, International Securities Law Enforcement: Recent Advances in 
Assistance and Cooperation, 27 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 635 (1994). More recently, the 
SEC spearheaded a global memorandum of understanding on enforcement. See SEC 
Announces IOSCO Unveiling of Multilateral Agreement on Enforcement Coopera-
tion, SEC News Dig., Issue 2003-208 (Oct. 31, 2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/digest/dig103103.txt (announcing multilateral agreement for 
sharing information among international regulators related to ongoing enforcement 
matters). 
91 See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Neorealism and Neoliberalism, 40 World Pol. 235, 236 
(1988). This arguably remains the same notwithstanding Russia’s ongoing departure 
from democracy and the aggressive tenure of the Putin regime. 
92 Id. at 238. 
93 See Charles W. Kegley, Jr. The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Re-
alist Myths and the New International Realities, 37 Int’l Stud. Q. 131, 135–38 (1993). 
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mocracies rarely, if ever, go to war with one another.94 There is a 
long tradition of attempts to explain the causes of democratic 
peace, extending back to the philosopher Immanuel Kant.95 Not the 
least important among the explanations offered is the observation 
that peace and cooperation among democratic states on both eco-
nomic and security affairs are made possible by their institutional 
structures—that is, transparency that permits open observation of 
policy choices, clear rules for continuity of governance, electoral 
accountability of political leaders, and constitutional governance.96 
These structures, taken as a whole, make democracies more reli-
able and predictable partners in the conduct of their international 
affairs, particularly with respect to the enforcement of their inter-
national agreements. 
Supportive of the vision of democratic peace has been the will-
ingness of certain nations, such as those in Europe, to cast aside 
important aspects of their sovereignty and integrate their econo-
mies,97 as well as the well-documented practices of many states to 
adhere voluntarily to international law even in circumstances 
where compliance runs counter to their immediate self-interest.98 A 
leading scholar in this area is Professor Robert Keohane, who has 
shown how international regimes or institutions can and have fa-
cilitated cooperation among governments, not by mandating what 
they should do, but rather by helping governments pursue their 
own interest through cooperation.99 Thus, the liber-
94 For an excellent presentation of the democratic peace thesis, see Charles Lipson, 
Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace 1 (2003) (indicat-
ing that the correlation holds not just for established democracies but also for newer, 
unstable democracies, which, as a general matter, are also reluctant to go to war with 
one another). 
95 See James D. Morrow, International Conflict: Assessing the Democratic Peace 
and Offense-Defense Theory, in Political Science: The State of the Discipline 172, 177 
(Ira Katznelson & Helen V. Milner eds., 2002) (providing a succinct overview of de-
mocratic peace theory). 
96 See Lipson, supra note 94, at 14. 
97 See Charles W. Kegley, Jr., The New Containment Myth: Realism and the Anom-
aly of European Integration, 5 Ethics & Int’l Affs. 99, 109–12 (1991). 
98 See Dorothy V. Jones, Code of Peace: Ethics and Security in the World of War-
lord States (1991); Christopher.C. Joyner, The Reality and Relevance of International 
Law, in The Global Agenda 202 (Charles W. Kegley, Jr. & Eugene R. Wittkopf eds., 
3d ed. 1992). 
99 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Po-
litical Economy 9, 13 (1984). 
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als/institutionalists do not reject the importance of national self-
interest, but see that international cooperation, perhaps through an 
international organization, can indeed empower nations.100
There is no central supreme authority to which all nations’ secu-
rities regulators are accountable. Individual nations share a com-
mon view of the importance of securities regulations in the devel-
opment and maintenance of their own economy. As seen earlier, 
there are four very broadly recognized objectives sought by securi-
ties laws. Though these objectives have broad support across na-
tions, currently nations vary widely in the details regarding how 
these objectives are to be achieved. And of even more importance 
to this Article, nations differ regarding both the regulatory costs 
they are willing to impose on issuers and the protection they afford 
to investors. 
A central issue, however, is given certain assumptions about the 
efficiency of capital markets, whether and to what extent the objec-
tives are compromised if a nation’s regulatory system cannot con-
trol the minimum level of disclosure that is to apply in its markets. 
On the one hand, if regulators and nations are persuaded that ced-
ing local control does not seriously compromise the domestic inter-
est embodied in the objectives of their securities laws, even the re-
alist can envision cooperative action among nations. On the other 
hand, if regulatory objectives are seriously compromised, the lib-
eral/institutionalist school provides a hopeful note that strong na-
tional interest may over time interact to lead to cooperative efforts 
that reduce differences. But to do so, there needs to be an under-
standing of just what local objectives are compromised, and to 
what a nation gains and what it loses when it forsakes its approach 
for that of another. The earlier portions of this Article counsel that 
strong, and not divergent, standards better fulfill the overall objec-
tives of an individual nation’s securities laws. At the same time, the 
forces of globalization are so unrelenting and powerful that there 
can hardly be room for the realist school’s preoccupation with each 
country’s securities regulations being an island unto itself. Thus, 
the model for action by the SEC is that of engagement and coop-
eration that is consistent with the liberal/institutional view. 
100 Id. at 244–45. 
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B. A Strategy for the SEC in a Global Marketplace 
Three decades ago, the SEC confronted an early challenge of 
globalization and did so in a manner that mirrors the position of 
the liberal/institutionalist perspective. Trading on inside informa-
tion was occurring in U.S. markets through Swiss bank accounts 
shielded from the inspection of regulators, domestic or foreign, by 
local blocking statutes.101 This development gave rise to a concerted 
SEC effort to enter into a series of Memoranda of Understanding 
(“MOU’s”) with governments around the world that ultimately 
had the effect of lifting regulatory standards and protections 
around the world.102 Today, we might well consider mutual recogni-
tion as the medium for achieving what earlier occurred via the in-
dividually negotiated MOU’s. 
When insider trading entered U.S. capital markets from abroad, 
it signaled that the world had significantly shrunk so that effective 
investor protection called for the SEC to become a statesman à la 
the liberal/institutionalist view; it did not respond as a well-armed 
domestic enforcer by muscling foreign regulators in a manner pre-
dicted by the realist school. The SEC met the challenge confront-
ing U.S. markets by raising standards around the globe for regulat-
ing insider trading and enforcement. Indeed, for decades the SEC 
has been an active agent for change in international securities mar-
kets with the result that markets around the world have become 
more efficient, transparent, and trustworthy. Indeed, it is likely the 
success in its efforts in improving regulation in other markets that 
explains why U.S. markets do not enjoy the dominant position they 
did even ten years ago.103 The fact that the regulatory gap has nar-
101 The SEC’s foray into this area was on a precedential blank slate. See Sec. Exch. 
Comm’n v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Common Stock of, and Call Options 
for the Common Stock of, Santa Fe Int’l Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 99,424, at 99,424 
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (seeking to freeze assets believed linked to insider trading profits); 
Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 112–13 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981) (seeking a temporary asset freeze of funds linked to the suspected insider trad-
ing). 
102 See generally Michael D. Mann et al., The Establishment of International 
Mechanisms for Enforcing Provisional Orders and Final Judgments Arising from Se-
curities Law Violations, 55 L. & Contemp. Probs. 303 (Autumn 1992) (describing the 
history of the SEC’s efforts to weave a network of MOU’s to address insider trading 
that ultimately lifted regulatory standards around the world). 
103 See, e.g., Jim O’Neill & Sandra Lawson, Is Wall Street Doomed?, Global Econ. 
Wkly., at 1–4 (Feb. 14, 2007) (finding that diminishing foreign IPOs and fewer secon-
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rowed, whether a lot or just somewhat, between U.S. markets and 
major foreign markets provides an easier ground for mutual recog-
nition to occur in ways that are more likely to fulfill each of the 
four regulatory objectives of host market securities laws. There 
simply is less ground to close today between U.S. markets and say 
London, Frankfurt, or Tokyo. 
Thus, the strategy for the United States is the earlier one pur-
sued with insider trading: engagement, persuasion, and persever-
ance. But in this quest, timing is important. For example, it quite 
likely was a wise choice for the SEC to cast aside the need for for-
eign issuers to reconcile their financial statements to GAAP, pro-
vided they employ high-quality IFRS for their financial reporting. 
The reconciliations were months late so that the report that mat-
tered was their earlier-released IFRS-based financial reports.104 
And, as to those reports, evidence suggests that U.S. analysts de-
ferred to foreign analysts for critical analysis of this information 
since the former were not skilled or experienced in IFRS.105 Thus, 
the GAAP-based reconciliation came too late and was an easy re-
quirement to cast aside. 
Nonetheless, the proposal that U.S. issuers will be permitted, or 
required, to use IFRS may be premature. This conclusion is most 
solidly based on the evidence, reviewed earlier, that convergence 
between GAAP and IFRS is not yet complete. And, more impor-
tant, there is a fundamental divergence with respect to the political 
culture by which financial reporting standards are to be established 
by the IASB and the political culture surrounding the FASB. As 
seen earlier, a significant contribution of the SOX in 2002 was con-
ditioning the SEC’s acceptance of an authoritative accounting 
standard setter on that body meeting certain requirements for in-
dependence in the appointment of its members and, most signifi-
dary listings by foreign issuers in the United States is not attributable to over-
regulation in the United States but to rising strength of foreign markets as well as his-
torical predilection for offerings and trading to occur near the issuer’s home market). 
104 The deadline for Form 20-F and its reconciliation is six months following the 
close of the foreign issuer’s fiscal year. 
105 Ramona Dzinkowski, Saying Goodbye to U.S. GAAP, Strategic Fin. 46, 47–48 
(June 2007) (reporting that of 165 companies rated by Moody’s, only thirteen had 
analysts in the United States while others were covered by foreign analysts versed in 
IFRS reporting). 
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cantly, its funding.106 This provision was designed to overcome the 
heavy self-interest reporting companies had exerted through their 
auditors’ willingness to support, through voluntary contributions, 
the work of the FASB prior to the enactment of SOX. It is equally 
premature to discuss abandoning GAAP without a full understand-
ing of what strategies the SEC can employ to influence standard 
setting in a body located in London rather than Stamford, Con-
necticut, the present location of the FASB. To paraphrase a fa-
mous remark by Justice William O. Douglas, just what weapon will 
the SEC keep behind the door to assure that the IASB meets the 
minimal expectations of the SEC?107
One likely strategy will be for the SEC to reserve, and discretely 
exercise, the option to compel supplemental disclosures, particu-
larly when it believes IFRS provides too weak a standard.108 To ex-
ercise this option, and to be a constructive participant in the delib-
106 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 108(b)(1)(iii), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 
745, 768 (2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77s(b)(1)(iii) (2006)) (amending 
Securities Act of 1933 § 19(b)(1)(iii), 48 Stat. 74). 
107 See William O. Douglas, Democracy and Finance 82 (James Allen ed., 1940) (re-
calling a previous observation that in regards to the SEC’s interface with the self-
regulatory role envisioned for the exchanges “[g]overnment would keep the shotgun, 
so to speak, behind the door, loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for use but with the 
hope it would never have to be used”). 
108 The interaction among regulators envisioned as a necessary component of mutual 
recognition is superior to all-out regulatory competition. The latter is not likely to 
succeed since the conditions for productive competition among regulators does not 
exist. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Juris-
dictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 Geo. 
L.J. 201, 206–07 (1997) (reviewing conditions believed to be necessary for productive 
regulatory competition and finding they exist only in the idealized world of assump-
tions); Cox, supra note 54, at 1232–33. If there were such competition it need not lead 
to a race to the bottom. See Eric J. Pan, Harmonization of U.S.-EU Securities Regu-
lation: The Case for a Single European Securities Regulator, 34 Law & Pol’y Int’l 
Bus. 499, 531 (2003) (explaining that before Prospectus Directive ushered in the port-
able passport for offerings and pubic listings there was little evidence that regulatory 
competition among E.U. members entailed a race to the bottom). Absent evidence 
that states will seek to dilute standards provides a hopeful note that engagement fol-
lowed by a mutual recognition strategy will yield stronger, not weaker, overall regula-
tion. There are those, however, who see divergence among regulators as a strength. 
They believe that regulators who provide multiple competing options will, much like 
the market for apples, yield a better allocation of results. See Stephen J. Choi & An-
drew T. Guzman, National Laws, International Money: Regulation in a Global Capi-
tal Market, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1855, 1879–81 (1997) (favoring a separation rather 
than a pooling equilibrium among regulators). 
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erations overseen by the IASB, the SEC must have an effective ac-
counting staff. It may well be that its current staff needs to have the 
same level of technical support and broad input to its operations as 
presently enjoyed by the FASB. Because standard setting is ongo-
ing and no accounting convention or principle can be expected to 
endure without recurrent valuation, the SEC needs a body to sup-
port its statutory obligation for setting financial reporting stan-
dards for U.S. capital markets. Just as U.S. product safety stan-
dards should not be outsourced to an international organization 
without at least meaningful oversight by a domestic agency, so it is 
that we should not cede authority over the metrics for financial re-
porting to an international body without being assured that our 
regulator has the expertise and resources to evaluate whether the 
metrics support the objectives sought by U.S securities laws. It thus 
seems wise to carry forward in some manner the important role 
that the FASB has played and will continue to play toward conver-
gence of reporting standards. This observation reflects the reality 
that convergence is not a point in time, but rather a continuum 
whereby nations, through their separate organizations, continue to 
engage one another. While such a robust operation may strike 
some as confrontational to the IASB, it should be seen as continu-
ing the United States’ commitment to high-quality reporting stan-
dards around the world. 
 
